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371 
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION AND 
CHARTER SCHOOLS: A GENERAL AND UNIFORM 
PROHIBITION? 
Asti Gallina
*
 
Abstract: In its 2015 opinion in Washington League of Women Voters v. State, the 
Washington State Supreme Court invalidated Initiative 1240—which authorized the creation 
of charter schools. The Court considered two issues on appeal: (1) that the charter schools 
unconstitutionally diverted common school funds to non-common schools; and (2) that the 
charter schools violated article IX, section 2 requiring the legislature to establish a “general 
and uniform system of common schools.” The Court resolved the case on the common school 
fund issue and did not reach the “general and uniform” challenge. In its slip opinion, the 
Court had included a footnote explaining that the charter schools under Initiative 1240 also 
violated the uniformity of the common school system. After denying the State’s petition for 
reconsideration, the Court issued an amended opinion omitting the footnote. Thus, the import 
of the article IX uniformity mandate on charter schools remains unsettled. 
In response to the Court’s opinion in League of Women Voters invalidating Initiative 
1240, the Washington State Legislature passed the Charter Public School Act (the CPSA). 
The CPSA establishes a system of charter schools outside the common school system. 
Because the Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered a challenge to charter 
schools under the article IX “general and uniform mandate,” it is unclear whether charter 
schools—which are relatively free from regulation and focused on providing alternative and 
varied learning experiences—can fit within a general and uniform system of public schools. 
This Comment argues that the uniformity requirement in article IX, section 2 of the 
Washington State Constitution requires the legislature to establish a uniform system of laws 
by which the public schools are administered. Although cases interpreting the article IX 
uniformity mandate emphasize the substantive uniformity of the schools themselves, the text 
of the Constitution, the structure of the public school system, and interpretations advanced in 
other contexts support a procedure-based interpretation. Because a procedurally uniform 
system does not necessarily require identical schools, this Comment argues that the charter 
school system established under the CPSA fits within the general and uniform system of 
public schools. 
INTRODUCTION 
Article IX of the Washington State Constitution requires the 
legislature to fund “a general and uniform system of public schools.”1 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Special thanks to Hugh Spitzer 
for his insightful critiques and guidance and to the members of Washington Law Review for their 
support throughout. The author is a Teach for America alumnus and taught at a charter school from 
2012–2014.  
1. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
14 - Gallina.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/29/2017 11:56 AM 
372 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:371 
 
That system must include “common schools, and such high schools, 
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established.”2 
In 2012, Washington State voters passed Initiative Measure 1240 (I-
1240), authorizing the creation of up to forty charter schools.
3
 The 
Initiative defined charter schools as common schools and provided that 
charter schools would be funded to the same extent, and with the same 
sources of funding, as other common schools.
4
 In September 2015, the 
Washington State Supreme Court declared I-1240 unconstitutional in 
League of Women Voters of Washington v. State (League of Women 
Voters).
5
 The Court held that charter schools under I-1240 were not 
common schools because they were not subject to local voter control.
6
 
As a result, the Court concluded charter schools could not receive certain 
funds restricted for the exclusive use of common schools.
7
 Because the 
decision effectively deprived charter schools of funding, the Court held 
the provision was not severable and invalidated the entire Initiative.
8
 
Opponents of Initiative 1240 challenged the law based on two distinct 
arguments. They argued that charter schools were not common schools 
and that the charter schools broke with the uniformity of the common 
school system.
9
 Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
King County Superior Court held that these schools satisfied the 
constitutional uniformity requirement, but did not qualify as common 
schools because of the lack of voter control.
10
 The Court held that the 
funding provision was severable, however, and did not invalidate the 
Initiative in its entirety.
11
 
The Washington State Supreme Court heard the case on direct 
review.
12
 Because it concluded that the funding provisions were not 
                                                     
2. Id. 
3. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 1240 (approved Nov. 6, 2012), https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/ 
osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/I-1240_complete 
_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJ4N-FYYH] (codified in various sections of WASH. REV. CODE § 28A 
(2014)); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710. 
4. Initiative Measure No. 1240, §§ 202(1), 215(1), 220, 223(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 28A.710.020(1), 28A.710.150(1), 28A.710.220, 28A.710.230(1)). 
5. 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015) (originally published Sept. 4, 2015).  
6. Id. at 404, 355 P.3d at 1137. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 410, 355 P.3d at 1140. 
9. Trial Order, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24977-4 SEA (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013), 2013 WL 11109512. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 397, 355 P.3d at 1133. 
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severable, it did not go on to address the uniformity arguments advanced 
by the plaintiffs.
13
 However, in its original opinion, the majority 
included a footnote suggesting that the charter legislation would also 
violate the constitutional requirement of a general and uniform system.
14
 
The majority later issued an amended opinion in which it omitted the 
footnote, deferring the question to a later date.
15
 By doing so, the Court 
left to another day the question whether charter schools can satisfy the 
constitutional requirement for a general and uniform system.
16
 
The Court issued its opinion the day before hundreds of students were 
set to begin the new school year, causing widespread confusion and 
uncertainty.
17
 In following months, students, teachers and lawyers 
scrambled to make sense of the ruling.
18
 Some politicians and judicial 
candidates denounced the Court’s decision.19 During the 2016 legislative 
session, the Washington State Legislature passed new charter legislation, 
known as the Charter Public School Act (CPSA), in an effort to keep the 
                                                     
13. Id.  
14. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash. Sept. 4, 
2015) (“[T]he absence of local control by voters would also violate the article IX uniformity 
requirement.”) 
15. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters of 
Wash., 184 Wash.2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (No. 89714-0). 
16. See Complaint, El Centro de la Raza v. State, No. 16-2-18527-4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 
2016) (“Plaintiffs seek to protect the interests relating to the education of children across the state 
and, in particular, their judicially enforceable right to have the State amply provide them with an 
education and establish a general and uniform system of public schools.”). 
17. See, e.g., Emma Brown, What Makes a Public School Public? Washington State Court Finds 
Charter Schools Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/what-makes-a-public-school-public-washington-state-court-finds-charter-schools-un 
constitutional/2015/09/08/706975c8-5632-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GCM6-CBSE] (“[T]he future is uncertain for the state’s nine charter schools and the 1,200 students 
who attend them.”); Gene Johnson, State’s Charter Schools to Stay Open Despite High Court 
Ruling, KOMO NEWS (Sept. 8, 2015), http://komonews.com/news/local/states-charter-schools-to-
stay-open-despite-high-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/APP4-UFUT] (describing Charter School 
Association’s commitment to keep charter schools open for the remainder of the school year despite 
unclear funding sources). 
18. Updated: WA Charters Statement on Yesterday’s State Supreme Court Ruling, WA 
CHARTERS (Sept. 5, 2015), http://wacharters.org/updated-wa-charters-statement-on-yesterdays-
state-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/G2UB-QYSA] (“Along with legal experts, we are 
carefully reviewing the decision to determine how this ruling will be applied. Until we know more, 
every public charter school plans to be open on Tuesday, September 8, and we will do everything in 
our power to ensure that there is no disruption for the students currently enrolled in Washington’s 
public charter schools.”).  
19. Former Gov. Gregoire on the State Supreme Court Ruling, WA CHARTERS (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://wacharters.org/former-gov-gregoire-on-the-state-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/B5TM -
UVRE]. 
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doors to Washington’s charter schools open.20 The CPSA defines charter 
schools as public schools operating outside of the common school 
system.
21
 Because they operate outside the common school system, 
charter schools are not subject to the same stringent standards articulated 
by the Court to qualify as common schools.
22
 However, the schools must 
still fit within the constitutional requirement for a “general and uniform” 
system of public schools.
23
 
The language requiring a “general and uniform” system of public 
schools was present in the original constitution ratified by the citizens of 
Washington in 1889.
24
 Since then, the Court has had few opportunities to 
define its scope.
25
 The bounds of the constitutional mandate, therefore, 
remain unclear. How much variation between individual schools does 
the Constitution permit while still maintaining a general and uniform 
system?
26
 Must all schools within the public school system be uniform, 
or is uniformity required only within each class of schools?
27
 In light of 
this constitutional ambiguity, how should the Court interpret the general 
and uniform requirement?
28
 Is there a place for charter schools within a 
general and uniform system?
29
 This Comment explores each of these 
questions and attempts to advance an interpretation of the “general and 
uniform” requirement that both (1) reflects the framer’s original intent 
and (2) allows for public schools that can adapt and accommodate 
students with diverse needs. 
                                                     
20. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207.  
21. League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 404, 355 P.3d 1131, 
1137 (2015). 
22. See infra section IV.A. 
23. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 2. 
24. Id. 
25. See infra section III.A. 
26. Cf. L.K. Beale, Charter Schools, Common Schools, and the Washington State Constitution, 72 
WASH. L. REV. 535, 551–53 (1997) (discussing the ambiguity of the language in art. IX, § 2); 
Education—Charter Schools—Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State 
Constitution—League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1811 (2016) [hereinafter Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act 
Violates State Constitution] (noting the Court left issues of uniformity unresolved in its opinion in 
League of Women Voters).  
27. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State 
Constitution, supra note 26. 
28. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State 
Constitution, supra note 26. 
29. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State 
Constitution, supra note 26. 
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Part I will discuss the history and ideology of both the common 
school and charter school movements. Part II will survey the major cases 
and legislation influencing charter schools in Washington State. Part III 
will examine the scope of article IX, section 4 of the Washington State 
Constitution, including its plain meaning, contemporaneous 
interpretations, case law, and modern practice and usage to inform the 
scope of the “general and uniform” mandate. This Comment will then 
argue that the mandate requires a “general” system of schools that is free 
and open to all. In addition, the legislature must maintain procedural 
uniformity in the operation of the law by prescribing a consistent set of 
procedures governing educational outcomes, administrative oversight, 
and funding. Finally, Part IV will examine whether the legislature’s new 
charter legislation satisfies the general and uniform mandate using the 
procedure-based interpretation advanced in Part III. This Comment 
concludes by arguing that the CPSA provides sufficient procedural 
uniformity in the establishment, administration and oversight of charter 
schools to survive a constitutional challenge on general and uniform 
grounds. 
I. THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE COMMON SCHOOL AND 
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENTS INFORM THE MODERN 
LEGAL DEBATE 
The challenges levied against charter schools in Washington State 
reflect the inherent tension between the charter school and common 
school models.
30
 The common school movement emerged in the 1830s 
as a response to the widely varying access to education for students 
throughout the country.
31
 Focused on providing all students with a 
quality education, the movement emphasized equality and uniformity as 
a means to provide students with equal access to education regardless of 
income or location.
32
 Over time, however, education activists began to 
question the common school movement’s one-size-fits-all approach to 
education.
33
 The charter school movement emerged as one solution to 
the perceived need for alternative educational paradigms.
34
 Like the 
                                                     
30. See generally League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 
(2015); Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909). 
31. CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 
1780–1860, at 5–7 (1983). 
32. See id. 
33. See, e.g., DANNY WEIL, CHARTER SCHOOLS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 12–14 (2000) 
(discussing various public school reform movements). 
34. See id. 
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common school movement, the charter school movement focuses on 
increasing student access to quality education.
35
 However, the charter 
school movement emphasizes individual choice and market forces as 
means to improve education.
36
 Charter school proponents believe that 
freeing schools to pursue diverse educational opportunities will allow 
parents and students to identify successful schools and permit the state to 
discontinue unsuccessful models.
37
 The Washington State Supreme 
Court’s decision in League of Women Voters drew heavily on concepts 
from the common school movement entrenched in the Washington 
Constitution to invalidate Initiative 1240.
38
 An overview of the two 
movements thus provides context for the larger debate over charter 
schools and informs the legal arguments on either side. 
A. The Common School Movement’s Emphasis on Uniformity 
Influenced Many State Constitutions and Education Laws 
Common schools are public schools that provide a basic K–12 
education. Three primary features characterize common schools: (1) the 
schools are open to all students of eligible age and are free to attend; (2) 
teachers maintain state-issued certifications; and (3) the schools are 
subject to the control of locally-elected board members.
39
 Because the 
common school movement influenced modern education, the 
movement’s origins inform the current legal landscape for schools in 
Washington
40
 and nationwide.
41
 
The common school movement emerged as a reform effort in 
response to the meager (and widely varying) access to education for 
students of different social classes and localities.
42
 Early American 
education was neither compulsory nor available to all students.
43
 
Deriving from the traditions of Colonial America, parents, churches, and 
                                                     
35. See JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE 
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 22 (2002). 
36. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 119–20. 
37. See id. 
38. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 405, 355 P.3d 1131, 1137 
(2015). 
39. Cf. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane County v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909). 
40. See League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 404, 355 P.3d at 1137 (discussing the features 
of a common school). 
41. See JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL: FROM THE PURITANS TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
102 (7th ed. 2008). 
42. See id. at 78–79. 
43. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 12 (1977). 
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municipalities organized early schools.
44
 Funding, teacher education, 
and curricula varied widely by location.
45
 For example, the 
Massachusetts General School Law of 1647 required towns of more than 
fifty households to provide a teacher to instruct the children to read and 
write; the law required larger towns to establish a school.
46
 By contrast, 
the schools in other states typically comprised an un-unified system of 
private-pay schools and charity schools.
47
 While most charity schools 
originated as church-run institutions for the education of indigent 
students, many charity schools eventually secured funding from city and 
state governments.
48
 
Following the American Revolution, the concept of formal education 
gained popularity.
49
 In 1779, Thomas Jefferson published A Bill for the 
More General Diffusion of Knowledge.
50
 Jefferson advocated for 
schoolhouses in every county that would provide at least three years of 
instruction in reading, writing, common math, and with an emphasis on 
classical history.
51
 Unlike many of his peers, Jefferson did not believe 
schools should provide religious or political instruction.
52
 Noah Webster, 
on the other hand, viewed public schooling as a means to instill common 
moral and social values in young students.
53
 Although the neutral 
ideology advanced by Jefferson prevailed, Webster made a lasting 
contribution in American education through the series of schoolbooks he 
developed, which gained widespread popularity throughout early 
common schools.
54
 
The common school movement took shape in the 1830s and 1840s 
when school reformers put into place the educational ideas advanced by 
                                                     
44. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 3. 
45. Id. at 4. 
46. Old Deluder Act (1647), MASS. GOV., http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/lawlib/docs/delu 
dersatan.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PMT-YDY7]. 
47. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 3–4. 
48. Id. at 6. 
49. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–1876, at 
5 (1980). See also Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, in ESSAYS ON 
EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 9, 9–23 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965). 
50. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), reprinted in 
THE SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 20 (James W. Fraser ed., 2d ed. 
2001). 
51. Id. at 21. 
52. Id. at 23–24. 
53. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
54. Id. 
14 - Gallina.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/29/2017 11:56 AM 
378 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:371 
 
earlier generations.
55
 Like Noah Webster, common school reformers 
advocated education as a way to reduce tensions between social classes, 
instill shared moral and civic values, and ensure an informed and 
capable citizenry fit to carry on the republican form of government.
56
 
Common schools differed from previous schools in several respects. 
First, the movement advocated educating students in a common 
schoolhouse.
57
 Reformers believed that by educating different groups of 
children together, hostilities and tensions between different groups 
would abate.
58
 Second, the schools sought to teach government policy-
making and nationalism.
59
 This was a particularly important goal prior to 
the civil war because views on American citizenship differed sharply.
60
 
A third feature of the movement was its role in influencing state 
legislatures to create agencies to oversee education.
61
 Although many 
states enacted laws requiring counties to provide for local education, the 
lack of centralized oversight continued the phenomenon of widely 
varying access to education.
62
 These three features formed the basis for 
many of the modern goals of education.
63
 The belief that human nature is 
malleable and that morality and civic duty can be taught remains central 
to education theory today.
64
 
Two of the most influential figures in advancing the early common 
school movement were Horace Mann and Henry Barnard.
65
 Between the 
1820s and 1850s, Mann and Barnard edited periodicals devoted to 
education and authored influential works regarding the necessity and 
                                                     
55. SPRING, supra note 41, at 78. 
56. See Horace Mann, Tenth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN 
ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 62–63 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957). 
57. SPRING, supra note 41, at 79. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. See also Common School Movement—Colonial and Republican Schooling, Changes in the 
Antebellum Era, the Rise of the Common School, EDUC. ENCYCLOPEDIA, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM, 
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1871/Common-School-Movement.html 
[https://perma.cc/RR2B-NU6C].  
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. See, e.g., Stefanie Sanford, Making Americans: Civic Education and the Common Core, 
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://edexcellence.net/commentary/education-
gadfly-daily/common-core-watch/making-americans-civic-education-and-the-common 
[https://perma.cc/U4GK-BTXS] (advocating education as a primary tool in the creation of civic-
minded citizens). 
65. SPRING, supra note 41, at 80–81. 
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purposes of common schools.
66
 During this same time, two important 
shifts were taking place in American society: the abolition of property 
requirements for suffrage and the widening disparity between social 
classes as a result of industrialization.
67
 Seizing on the uncertain political 
atmosphere, Mann argued that schools must educate children on the 
importance of using the vote rather than violence to effect political 
change.
68
 
As the common school movement gained traction, it gained 
popularity with political groups that advocated common schools as a 
means of furthering policy goals. Many advocates for common schools 
were members of the newly-formed Whig party who believed that the 
government should intervene to provide services such as a free public 
education to society.
69
 The Jacksonian Democrats—the other major 
political party at the time—opposed the common school movement, 
arguing that social order would naturally emerge, and instead supported 
a system of locally-controlled schools.
70
 Industrialization gave rise to 
additional education-based concerns, and the Workingmen’s party 
emerged with educational demands.
71
 The Workingmen’s party, which 
gained influence in the Eastern states in the late 1820s, advocated 
education as a means to protect individual rights.
72
 
As the common school movement took hold, many states began to 
codify a right to education either in their state constitutions or legislation 
creating an affirmative right to education.
73
 Legislation from this time 
                                                     
66. Id. at 81. 
67. See WAYNE J. URBAN & JENNINGS L. WAGONER, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION: A HISTORY 90 
(5th ed. 2014). Notably, in the southern states, most slaves had no access to formal education and 
opportunities for free blacks were limited. See, e.g. Slave Code of South Carolina, DUHAIME, 
http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-1503/1740-Slave-Code-of-South-Carolina-
Articles-44-49.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZAB9-9VLD] (imposing a fine on individuals who educate 
slaves). 
68. See Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE 
MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 93 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957) (“Had the obligations of 
the future citizen been sedulously inculcated upon all the children of this Republic, would the 
patriot have had to mourn over so many instances, where the voter, not being able to accomplish his 
purpose by voting, has proceeded to accomplish it by violence . . . .”).  
69. Mark Groen, The Whig Party and the Rise of Common Schools, 1837–1854: Party and Policy 
Reexamined, 35 AM. EDUC. HIST. J. 251, 252 (2008). 
70. SPRING, supra note 41, at 92. 
71. Id. at 89–90. 
72. See id. at 90 (quoting an editorial in The Workingmen’s Advocate from 1830 arguing, “The 
right of self government implies a right to a knowledge necessary to the exercise of the right of self 
government. If all have an equal right to the first, all must consequently have an equal right to the 
second; therefore, all are entitled to equal compensation.”) (citation omitted). 
73. See SPRING, supra note 41, at 92. 
14 - Gallina.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/29/2017 11:56 AM 
380 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:371 
 
strongly reflects common school influences.
74
 For example, the Enabling 
Act admitting North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington to 
the Union specifically designated federal land grants “for the use and 
benefit of the common schools” of the states.75 Likewise, the 
constitutions of many western states chartered in the mid-1800s include 
language referring specifically to common schools.
76
 This is significant 
because it reveals the extent to which the values of the common school 
movement shaped the landscape of education law. 
As demonstrated by the conflict between the Whigs and the 
Jacksonian-Democrats, the success of the common school movement 
could be viewed, at least in part, as a triumph of one political ideology 
over another. Common schools enforce uniformity through centralized 
governmental control to achieve educational equality.
77
 
B. The Charter School Movement Advocated Education Reforms that 
Allowed for Variation and Individualization 
A public charter school is a publicly funded school typically governed 
by a group or organization under a contract, known as a charter.
78
 
Schools can be independent single-site schools or operate as part of a 
network run by a central managing organization.
79
 Either nonprofit 
organization or for-profit management organizations may operate charter 
schools, depending on the state legislation.
80
 The charter exempts the 
school from certain state or local regulations. This exemption provides 
the school with greater autonomy to educate its students.
81
 In exchange 
                                                     
74. See, e.g., Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (providing funds 
specifically for the benefit of common schools). The tradition of dedicating public lands for 
education dates all the way back to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See Northwest Ordinance, 
OUR DOCUMENTS, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=8 [https://perma. 
cc/VW8M-3KNP].  
75. Id. at 682. 
76. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1889); IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12 (1857); NEV. CONST. art. 
11, § 2 (1864); N.D. CONST. art X, § 24 (1889); WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1889). 
77. See SPRING, supra note 41, at 93. 
78. Fast Facts: Charter Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 [https://perma.cc/BME3-ZB5G]. 
79. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CHARTER SCHOOL 
MOVEMENT 2 (2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/New-Closed-
2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4BU-2ZCP]. 
80. See id. A survey of charter schools operating throughout the nation during the 2015–16 school 
year found that 15% of charter schools were operated by education management organizations, 26% 
were operated by charter management organizations, and 59% were independently operated. 
81. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 6–7. 
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for this flexibility, the charter school must perform in accordance with 
the accountability measures prescribed by its charter.
82
 
At the end of the contract term, the charter authorizing entity can 
either renew or terminate the school’s charter.83 Authorizers should base 
this decision on how well the school adhered to its charter contract and 
the outcomes it achieved for schools.
84
 In this way, charter schools 
engage in a tradeoff: greater autonomy in exchange for strict 
accountability.
85
 Rather than complying with the numerous state-
promulgated rules and regulations that govern district schools, charter 
schools are relatively free to experiment.
86
 Proponents of charter schools 
argue that this pressure to perform will motivate the schools to use their 
autonomy to improve educational outcomes for students.
87
 
Charter schools are not the first attempt to decentralize schools and 
work around the regulations and bureaucracy perceived to stifle 
innovation in public schools.
88
 Innovative schools, magnet schools, and 
alternative schools appeared before the charter school model for school 
reform.
89
 Innovative schools were district-based schools utilizing 
experimental curricula and instructional techniques.
90
 These schools 
were different because they directly incorporated input from teachers, 
parents, and community members.
91
 Magnet schools emerged in the 
1970s as a way to attract diverse parents and students through additional 
funding and specialized curriculum and instruction.
92
 Charter school 
proponents identified their model as a means to serve students who were 
                                                     
82. See id. at 6. 
83. See id. at 7. 
84. Marc Dean Millot, Autonomy, Accountability, and the Values of Public Education, CTR. ON 
REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. 8 (1996), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/ pub_crpe_aavpe_ 
dec96_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/99VM-WJRP].  
85. See MURHPY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 52–53. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. Importantly, this theory is valid only if authorizers actually enforce performance 
requirements under the charter contract.  
88. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 7–9, 33. 
89. See JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 5–10 (1996). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. WEIL, supra note 33, at 7–9. See also What are Magnet Schools?, MAGNET SCHS. OF AM., 
http://www.magnet.edu/about/what-are-magnet-schools [https://perma.cc/J6QH-28SM]. Magnet 
schools were also used as desegregation incentives. Id. 
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not succeeding in traditional school settings, such as students with a 
pattern of behavioral problems or students at risk of dropping out.
93
 
Ray Budde and Albert Shanker are generally credited with developing 
the charter school concept throughout the 1980s.
94
 Ray Budde, a New 
England educator, first coined the term “charter school” in his 1974 
paper presented to the Society for General Systems Research titled 
Education by Charter: Restructuring School Districts.
95
 Budde’s model 
envisioned chartering academic departments or programs rather than 
entire schools.
96
 He believed that successful charter departments could 
then serve as models for larger school or district-wide reform.
97
 Budde’s 
vision gained substantial momentum after another education reformer, 
Al Shanker, presented the charter model during a National Press Club 
speech.
98
 Shanker and the American Federation of Teachers saw charter 
schools as a vehicle to address the eighty percent of students who were, 
they said, not adequately served by traditional district schools.
99
 In 
contrast with Budde, Shanker advocated chartering entire schools rather 
than departments or programs.
100
 Under Shanker’s framework, teachers 
unions would work together with school boards to review charter school 
proposals.
101
 Teachers would be given the same resources as teachers in 
traditional district schools.
102
 Shanker and Budde both advocated 
allowing charter schools to demonstrate results over defined periods of 
time.
103
 
In 1991, Minnesota passed the nation’s first charter school statute.104 
The legislation provided for the establishment of up to eight charter 
                                                     
93. WEIL, supra note 33, at 33–34. See generally RICHARD NEUMANN, SIXTIES LEGACY: A 
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS MOVEMENT, 1967–2001 (2003). 
94. NATHAN, supra note 89, at 62–63. 
95. See Ray Budde, Education by Charter, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 518, 518–20 (1989). 
96. Id. at 519. 
97. Id. 
98. NATHAN, supra note 89, at 62–63. 
99. See Albert Shanker, Charter Schools: Open for Other 80 Percent, 45 SCH. ADMIN. 72, 72 
(1988). 
100. Reynaldo Contreras, The Charter School Movement in California and Elsewhere, 27 EDUC. 
& URB. SOC’Y 213, 215 (1995). 
101. Albert Shanker, Restructuring Our Schools, 65 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 88, 98 (1988). 
102. Id. 
103. See Budde, supra note 95, at 519 (proposing charter terms of three to five years); Shanker, 
supra note 99 (proposing charter terms of five to ten years). 
104. 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 265, art. 9, § 3; see also MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, 
at 27. 
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schools throughout the state.
105
 The schools were free from most state 
and local education regulations except mandatory teaching certification 
requirements.
106
 The law permitted both the local school board and the 
state school board to authorize charter schools.
107
 The law provided that 
each charter school would have a board, comprised primarily of 
teachers.
108
 Subsequent amendments to the law removed the 
requirements for local school board approval.
109
 The legislature also 
repealed the cap on charter schools, allowing an unlimited number of 
charter schools.
110
 In addition, the state authorized public and private 
four-year and community colleges to sponsor charter schools.
111
 
Since the Minnesota legislation passed in 1991, the number of charter 
schools has grown rapidly.
112
 In 1999, approximately 350,000 students 
throughout the nation attended charter schools.
113
 Due to the 
proliferation of charter school legislation throughout the 1990s, that 
number increased to roughly 3.5 million students by 2015.
114
 As of 
December 2016, forty-two states have passed legislation providing for 
the establishment of charter schools.
115
 Additionally, states continue to 
amend and expand existing charter school policies. As of December 
2016, states have considered 218 bills amending or expanding existing 
charter school finance legislation.
116
 
Charter school proponents argue that the choice charter schools 
provide to parents to opt for an alternative educational experience for 
                                                     
105. MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 28. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. THOMAS L. GOOD, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND CHARTERS, ch. 
5 (2009) (ebook). 
113. Id. 
114. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 
& STUDENTS, 2014–2015, at 1 (Feb. 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/open_closed_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W7K-WP69]. 
115. The Last Eight States Without Charter Laws, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM (2016), 
https://www.edreform.com/2013/01/the-last-eight-states-without-charter-school-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/UCE2-786G]. 
116. State Legislation—Choice of Schools—Charter Schools—Finance, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE 
STS., http://b5.caspio.com/dp.asp?AppKey=b7f93000695b3d0d5abb4b68bd14&id=a0y70000000 
Cbm6AAC [https://perma.cc/Z79G-W66A]. 
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their children increases educational quality in all schools.
117
 Following 
this logic, school choice benefits even students who do not attend charter 
schools because traditional schools must provide better academic 
programs to compete for students.
118
 Moreover, charter schools can 
serve as small-scale laboratories for experiments in educational 
innovation.
119
 By allowing teachers and administrators greater autonomy 
to experiment, charter schools put the decision-making power in the 
hands of experts rather than politicians.
120
 
Opponents of charter schools criticize public school privatization.
121
 
Because many states’ charter school laws permit for-profit companies to 
sponsor charter schools, education management organizations and 
charter management organizations have emerged to run charter schools 
for a profit.
122
 Another common objection to charter schools focuses on 
the lack of measurable results.
123
 Over twenty years after the first charter 
schools opened in Minnesota, studies measuring the effectiveness of 
charter schools are still wholly inconclusive.
124
 Further, charter school 
opponents often criticize charter schools for the use of “weed out” or 
“skimming” techniques, which are policies and tactics used by schools 
to selectively shape the school’s student body.125 This practice not only 
                                                     
117. See, e.g., NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., SEPARATING FACT & FICTION: WHAT YOU 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS 11 (2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/08/Separating-Fact-from-Fiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB79-4VLW] (describing reasons 
parents value school choice options). 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. 
121. See, e.g., SPRING, supra note 41, at 474–79 (characterizing charter schools as part of the 
school privatization movement); Valerie Strauss, A Primer on the Damaging Movement to Privatize 
Public Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2016/01/07/a-primer-on-the-damaging-movement-to-privatize-public-schools/ 
[https://perma.cc/JTN2-EMUB] (characterizing the charter school movement as an outgrowth of 
private corporate interests). 
122. Marian Wang, When Charter Schools Are Nonprofit in Name Only, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 9, 
2014, 10:49 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-charter-schools-are-nonprofit-in-name-
only [https://perma.cc/QEP2-HSVF].  
123. Charter Schools: Finding Out the Facts: At a Glance, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC., 
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-a-school/Charter-schools-
Finding-out-the-facts-At-a-glance [https://perma.cc/8BG7-UJAF] (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  
124. See id.; CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24 (2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20 
Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2636-BC9W].  
125. Stephanie Simon, Special Report: Class Struggle—How Charter Schools Get Students They 
Want, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-charters-
admissions-idUSBRE91E0HF20130216 [https://perma.cc/CFE7-YYVH]. But see Charter Schools 
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artificially inflates performance indicators, but also contributes to school 
segregation because students that are not admitted to charter schools 
return to their local district schools.
126
 Finally, the high-stakes 
accountability measures in place for charters make them more likely to 
close than district counterparts.
127
 Charter school opponents fear these 
frequent school closures may result in a transient educational landscape 
in already-disadvantaged areas.
128
 
Despite inconclusive outcomes, charter schools remain a popular tool 
in the school reform movement.
129
 Perhaps because of the immense 
variation inherent in the charter school model, the effectiveness of 
specific school models and curricular techniques may not become 
apparent for many years to come.
130
 Nonetheless, what charter schools 
lack in definitive statistics, they make up for in popularity.
131
 Although 
the public opinion is far from settled on the effectiveness and desirability 
of charter schools as an alternative to traditional district schools,
132
 their 
national proliferation suggests the charter school model will continue to 
be a feature of the school reform movement for the foreseeable future. 
II. WASHINGTON STATE’S TURBULENT ROAD TO CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 
A. Common Schools in Washington State 
In Washington State, the influence of the common school 
movement’s ideals is evident in the text of the state Constitution and in 
early education laws. The Washington State Constitution, ratified in 
1889, contains a provision specifically directing the legislature to 
provide for a system of common schools.
133
 Likewise, passing 
legislation establishing a common school system was one of the 
                                                     
Aren’t Creaming the Best Students, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/ 
2013/02/charter-schools-arent-creaming-the-best-students/ [https://perma.cc/H8GQ-K7UX]. 
126. See Simon, supra note 124. 
127. See Sarah Butrymowicz, When Charter Schools Fail, What Happens to the Kids?, 
HECHINGER REP. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://hechingerreport.org/when-charter-schools-fail-what-
happens-to-the-kids/ [https://perma.cc/7UWJ-MDKN]. 
128. See id. 
129. See NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 117. 
130. See supra notes 123–24. 
131. See supra note 115. 
132. See supra notes 123–25. 
133. WASH. CONST. amend. IX. 
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Washington State Territorial Legislature’s first acts.134 The legislation 
provided numerous mechanisms to ensure the school uniformity and 
equal access for students, including the establishment of a permanent 
school fund, teacher certification requirements, and procedures to elect 
local district directors.
135
 Despite promising legislation, the fragmented 
system of districts established in the Act failed to promptly achieve the 
widespread uniform system of education.
136
 Documents from this initial 
phase are scarce and reflect the lack of centralized accountability.
137
 
In 1877, the legislature enacted further legislation to unify the school 
system and improve school laws.
138
 The resulting education system bore 
many features that Washington residents may associate with modern 
public schools.
139
 The law established a general course of study for 
common school students and established a Territorial Board of 
Education (the Board).
140
 The law gave the Board the power to ensure 
uniform educational quality by adopting textbooks, setting school 
governance rules, certifying teachers, and overseeing teachers, directors, 
and superintendents.
141
 
After statehood, the Washington State Supreme Court added 
substantially to the understanding of the bounds of the common school 
system with its 1907 opinion in School District No. 20, Spokane County 
v. Bryan.
142
 In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Model Training School Act,
143
 a law passed by the Washington State 
Legislature that provided for the establishment of a model training 
school department in state normal schools.
144
 Another outgrowth of the 
common school movement, normal schools were post-secondary teacher 
training schools.
145
 Common school proponents emphasized that 
                                                     
134. Act of Apr. 12, 1854, 1854 Wash. Terr. Laws 319. 
135. Id. 
136. Beale, supra note 26, at 541. 
137. Id. 
138. Act to Provide a System of Common Schools for the Territory of Washington, 1877 Wash. 
Terr. Laws 259. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909). 
143. 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 181. 
144. Id. at 500, 99 P. at 28. 
145. See, e.g., BRAIN L. FIFE, OLD SCHOOL STILL MATTERS 25–29 (2013) (describing the role of 
uniform education for instructors in achieving uniform education for students). 
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uniform teacher training would yield a uniform quality of education 
throughout the state.
146
 
Under Washington’s Model Training School Act, the normal schools 
would include a “model training school” comprising students from local 
districts.
147
 The model training school would operate as a primary 
school, but student teachers would instruct the classes under the 
supervision of instructors.
148
 Unlike common schools, which were 
governed by an elected school board, an appointed board of trustees 
supervised the normal schools.
149
 The Act directed the superintendent to 
apportion funding for the model training school “out of the funds 
available for the support of the common schools”150 based on the number 
of pupils in attendance.
151
 The superintendent would apportion funds to 
the model training schools based on the number of students enrolled.
152
 
The Cheney School District challenged the funding mechanisms of 
the Model Training School Act.
153
 The District sought an injunction in 
Thurston County Superior Court to prevent the superintendent of public 
instruction from apportioning funds to the model training department of 
the normal school.
154
 The court granted the injunction and issued an 
order directing that much of the Act relating to the model training school 
department of normal schools and providing apportionment of funds 
therefor was “unconstitutional and void.”155 On appeal, the State 
identified four assignments of error.
156
 Each centered on the question of 
whether the Model Training School Act required a diversion of the 
common school fund in violation of the constitution.
157
 
Resolution of the case required the Washington State Supreme Court 
to determine whether the model training school was a common school 
within the meaning of the state constitution.
158
 Cheney School District 
argued that a common school is any school that “(1) [is] maintained at 
                                                     
146. Id. 
147. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 500, 99 P. at 28 (1909). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 501, 99 P. at 28. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 501, 99 P. at 29.  
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 502, P. at 29. 
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public expense; [and] (2) provide[s] a course of elementary education for 
children of all classes of people.”159 The Court rejected this definition, 
holding that a common school within the meaning of the Constitution is 
one “that is common to all children of proper age and capacity, free, and 
subject to, and under the control of, the qualified voters of the school 
district.”160 
The Court next determined that model training schools were not 
common schools under the constitution.
161
 The Court’s conclusion 
centered on the model training school’s system of governance.162 It 
noted that the principal was not an officer authorized to found a school 
under the constitutional scheme.
163
 It also observed that the teachers in 
the training school were not teachers within the meaning of the law, 
which requires teacher certification.
164
 Most importantly, the Court 
emphasized that the schools were not under “complete control” of the 
voters “with the power to discharge [the officials] if they are 
incompetent.”165 Because the model training school lacked these 
essential features, the court held it could not qualify as a common school 
under article IX, section 2. 
In its opinion, authored by Justice Stephen Chadwick, the Court 
clearly circumscribed the legislature’s power to allocate common school 
funds: “To say that the Legislature can determine what institutions shall 
receive the proceeds of the school fund, and that whatever they 
determine to be entitled thereto becomes ipso facto a common school, is 
begging the whole question, and annulling the constitutional 
restriction.”166 Despite its opinion striking down the Model Training 
School Act, the Court also left the door open to alternative funding 
pathways: “It is not that the Legislature cannot make provision for the 
support of a model training school, but in its attempt to do so, it has 
made provision for it out of the wrong fund.”167 
Bryan is a landmark decision in Washington’s education 
jurisprudence. The opinion highlights the importance of legislative acts 
                                                     
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
161. Id. at 503–04, 99 P. at 29–30. 
162. Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 504–05, 99 P. at 30 (quoting People ex rel. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum Soc. v. 
Bd. of Educ., 13 Barb. 400, 410 (N.Y. 1851)). 
167. Id. at 506, 99 P. at 32. 
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funding schools by tethering them directly to the language of the 
Washington State Constitution.
168
 The Court’s decision also solidified 
the role of the judiciary in checking unconstitutional funding 
mechanisms. In its opinion, the Court set a strict, formalistic tone and 
made clear that appeals to convenience and efficiency would not be 
sufficient to overcome the constitutional mandates regarding school 
legislation.
169
 The Court acknowledged the State’s argument that the 
schools met the same educational needs and were likely superior in 
effectiveness to other common schools.
170
 Nonetheless, it invalidated the 
law based on its holding that model training schools were not common 
schools. 
The Bryan decision also provides definitions to clarify two malleable 
terms used in article IX, section 4. First, the court defined a common 
school as one that is: (1) open to all students; (2) tuition-free; and (3) 
subject to the control of voters.
171
 The third element is largely what 
distinguishes common schools from other forms of public schools 
established by the State.
172
 Thus, unlike universities and normal schools, 
which operate under the control of an appointed board of trustees, voters 
elect each member of the common school board.
173
 Second—though not 
at issue in the case—the Bryan decision also provided some insight into 
the meaning of term “uniform” as used in article IX, section 2.174 The 
Court explained that a uniform system of common schools requires that 
“every child shall have the same advantages and be subject to the same 
discipline as every other child.”175 
The Bryan Court’s formalistic analysis and its definition of common 
schools have informed subsequent decisions in the realm of education.
176
 
Its influence is most clearly found in the Court’s opinion in League of 
Women Voters.
177
 The Bryan opinion has, therefore, shaped not only 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding the requirements of article IX, 
section 2, but also education legislation by providing guidance as to the 
                                                     
168. Id. at 501–02, 99 P. at 29–30. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. See id. at 502, 99 P. at 29. 
174. See id.  
175. Id. 
176. See infra section III.A. 
177. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015). 
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permissible scope of the legislature’s freedom to create new school 
models or systems. 
B. Charter Schools in Washington State 
The charter school debate in Washington extends over two decades. 
Washington voters first considered Initiative 177, which would have 
allowed for privately run, publicly funded schools, in 1996.
178
 This 
legislation reflected the goals of the broader school choice reform 
movement that had taken hold throughout the nation.
179
 That same year, 
voters also considered Initiative 173, which would have directed the 
legislature to issue vouchers allowing parents to use public education 
funds to allow students to attend schools of the parents’ choosing.180 
Both initiatives failed, with sixty-four percent of voters voting against 
the charter school bill.
181
 Voter initiatives and legislative proposals 
surfaced several times in the years following the 1996 initiative. In 2004, 
the Washington State Legislature passed Engrossed Second Substitute 
House Bill 2295 authorizing charter public schools.
182
 However, 
Washington voters rejected the law using a veto referendum.
183
 
Consequently, no charter legislation has been successful in Washington 
until Initiative 1240 in 2012.
184
 
1. Voters Pass Initiative 1240 Authorizing Charter Schools in 2012 
In 2012, Washington State voters passed the Washington Charter 
School Initiative, known as Initiative 1240.
185
 Initiative 1240 permitted 
                                                     
178. See Dick Lilly, School-Choice Debate Lands on State Ballot—Initiative 177 for Independent 
Schools; Initiative 173 for School Vouchers, SEATTLE TIMES, (Oct. 20, 1996), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961020&slug=2355318 
[https://perma.cc/QD3C-FRMQ]. 
179. Id. (noting that the legislation would create schools “similar to the charter schools springing 
up in other states”). 
180. Id. 
181. See LEAGUE OF EDUC. VOTERS FOUND., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND WASHINGTON STATE 1–2 
(2011), http://educationvoters.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/White-paper-charter-schools-010511 
-LEVF.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KKM-FUV9]. 
182. ch. 22, 2004 Wash. Sess. Law.  
183. Washington Charter School Authorization, Referendum 55, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Charter_School_Authorization,_Referendum_55_(2004) 
[https://perma.cc/X3KH-S24L]. 
184. See, e.g., H.B. 2295, 2004 Leg., 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004) (proposing charter 
schools). 
185. Initiative Measure No. 1240, §§ 202(1), 215(1), 220, 223(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 28A.710.020(1), 28A.710.150(1), 28A.710.220, 28A.710.230(1) (2014)). 
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the state to open up to forty public charter schools during the following 
five years.
186
 Many of the requirements for charter schools specified in 
Initiative 1240 reflected the common school requirements identified by 
the Washington State Supreme Court in Bryan.
187
 Like traditional 
district schools, charter schools under Initiative 1240 were free and open 
to all students in the district.
188
 Initiative 1240 also required charter 
schools to provide students a basic education
189
 in compliance with the 
same academic standards as the district counterparts.
190
 To ensure 
compliance, Initiative 1240 required charter schools to participate in the 
same academic learning assessments administered in all common 
schools.
191
 Finally, Initiative 1240 required all instructors to meet the 
state teacher certification requirements.
192
 
In many ways, the oversight mechanisms for charter schools also 
resembled those for district schools. In district schools, a superintendent 
monitors the schools.
193
 The superintendent is accountable to the locally 
elected school board, which makes decisions regarding funding, staffing, 
curricula, and other matters essential to steering the schools.
194
 Under 
Initiative 1240, a charter school board undertook many of the duties of a 
district’s superintendent.195 The board operated the school according to 
                                                     
186. Id. § 215(1). 
187. See Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909). 
188. Initiative Measure No. 1240 § 101(n)(iv). Students must apply to the charter school, but 
unlike many private schools the student does not need to compete for a spot at the school. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 28A.710.050(1) (2014). If more students want to attend a specific charter school than 
the school can accommodate, enrollment is determined by a random lottery. Id. § 28A.710.050(3). 
189. Under Washington State law, a basic education does not have a static definition but is one 
which “provide[s] students with the opportunity to become responsible and respectful global 
citizens, to contribute to their economic well-being and that of their families and communities, to 
explore and understand different perspectives, and to enjoy productive and satisfying lives.” WASH. 
REV. CODE § 28A.150.210. 
190. Id. § 28A.710.040(2)(b). 
191. The superintendent establishes these assessments, which measure academic proficiency 
throughout elementary, middle, and high school. Id. § 28A.655.070. The results are used to inform 
educational instructional practices and to identify students who have not mastered the academic 
requirements appropriate for their grade. Id. 
192. Id. § 28A.410.025. This requirement appears to be a direct response to the Court’s holding in 
Bryan, as charter legislation in most states does not require instructors to possess education-specific 
credentials. See generally Charter Schools—Do Teachers in a Charter School Have to be Certified?, 
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STS. (June 2014), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1425 
[https://perma.cc/TDG2-5UBL]. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.040(1). 
194. Id. § 28A.320.015. 
195. Id. § 28A.710.030. 
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the terms of its charter contract
196
 and was accountable to its charter 
school authorizer.
197
 A charter school board also provided many of the 
same functions as a district school board.
198
 In addition, authorizers were 
required to develop and enforce policies regarding student performance, 
school oversight, financial management, and charter renewal.
199
 Unlike a 
district school board, however, local voters do not necessarily elect a 
charter school authorizer.
200
 Although district school boards could serve 
as authorizers, Initiative 1240 also granted the Washington Charter 
School Commission the authority to establish charter schools anywhere 
in the state.
201
 
Initiative 1240 directed the superintendent to determine the 
allocations using the same school funding scheme used to determine 
funding for district schools.
202
At the state level, the funding for charter 
schools under Initiative 1240 was almost identical to that required for 
traditional district schools.
203
 Like district schools, charter schools would 
receive allocations from the superintendent of public instruction.
204
 
Although Initiative 1240’s funding allocation process was identical to 
that used for district schools, the process by which charter schools 
utilized that funding differed.
205
 Initiative 1240 permitted charter schools 
to spend funding in accordance with the school’s charter contract.206 
A final point of difference between charter and district schools under 
Initiative 1240 was the requirement for annual reports.
207
 Under 
Initiative 1240, the state Board of Education was required to issue an 
annual report on the state’s charter schools to the governor, the 
                                                     
196. Id. The charter contract is the authorizing document that permits charter schools to operate. 
Id. § 28A.710.010(4). Under the contract, the charter school agrees to provide basic educational 
services and to conform to the academic and operational performance expectations set out in the 
contract. Id. § 28A.710.160. 
197. Id. § 28A.710.100. Two entities can authorize charter schools: the charter school 
commission and local school district boards that have been approved as authorizers by the 
commission. Id. § 28A.710.080. 
198. See id. § 28A.710.100. 
199. Id. In addition, authorizers solicit and evaluate charter applications, execute charter contracts 
with each charter school, and monitor schools in accordance with charter contracts. Id. 
200. Id. § 28A.710.080. 
201. Id. § 28A.710.180(1). 
202. Initiative Measure No. 1240, § 222. 
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.220. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. § 28A.710.250(2). 
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legislature, and the general public.
208
 The report would include a 
comparison of charter school student performance across academic, 
ethnic, and economic lines;
209
 the Board’s assessments of the charter 
schools’ successes and areas for improvement;210 and a report on the 
sufficiency of charter school funding and charter school efficiency in 
utilizing those funds.
211
 
2. The Washington State Supreme Court Holds Initiative 1240 
Unconstitutional in League of Women Voters of Washington v. 
State 
After voters passed Initiative 1240 in 2012, eight charter schools 
opened in the state.
212
 One of the schools, First Place Scholars, faced 
public scrutiny because the school received $200,000 in excess state 
funding due to inaccurate reports of staff and student enrollment 
numbers.
213
 Unlike First Place Scholars, which operated for nearly three 
decades as a private school, the seven other charter schools that opened 
following Initiative 1240 were entirely new.
214
 As students in Seattle, 
Tacoma and Spokane enrolled in the newly opened charter schools, 
parent and community activists mounted a legal opposition to the charter 
school law.
215
 
In 2013, community members and organizations, including League of 
Women Voters of Washington and El Centro de la Raza, filed a suit in 
King County Superior Court seeking to halt implementation of the 
Initiative.
216
 They sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the 
                                                     
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. John Higgins, Wave of Charter Schools Debuts With All Seats Filled, SEATTLE TIMES, (Aug. 
17, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/wave-of-charter-schools-debuts-
with-all-seats-filled/ [https://perma.cc/9MSQ-NG9Q] (noting that, in addition to the existing charter 
school in Seattle, three schools planned to open in Seattle, three planned to open in Tacoma, and 
two planned to open in Spokane).  
213. John Higgins, State’s First Charter School Was Overpaid $200,000, SEATTLE TIMES, (Sept. 
21, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/audit-comes-down-hard-on-states-
first-charter-school/ [https://perma.cc/45Y9-JXF4]. 
214. See Higgins, supra note 212. 
215. See Brian M. Rosenthal, Coalition’s Suit Challenges State’s Charter-Schools Law, SEATTLE 
TIMES, (Jul. 3, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/coalitionrsquos-suit-challenges-
statersquos-charter-schools-law/ [https://perma.cc/8R8F-FAYF]. 
216. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at *3–8, League of Women Voters 
of Washington v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 
2013). 
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Initiative and a declaratory judgment that the Initiative violated the 
Washington State Constitution.
217
 After both sides moved for summary 
judgment, the trial court found that charter schools met the constitution’s 
uniformity requirement but were not common schools because they were 
not subject to local voter control.
218
 Consequently, the trial court held 
that the Initiative unconstitutionally diverted funds to non-common 
schools.
219
 However, the court also found that the funding provisions 
were severable, and held that the Initiative was otherwise 
constitutional.
220
 
On direct appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed with 
the trial court that the Initiative improperly designated charter schools as 
“common schools” and unconstitutionally diverted funds from the 
common school fund.
221
 The majority based much of its opinion on its 
1909 Bryan holding.
222
 Because charter schools are governed by 
appointed, rather than elected, members of the charter school board, the 
Court reasoned that charter schools are not subject to local voter 
control.
223
 As a result, charter schools could not be common schools 
under the definition established in Bryan, and therefore could not receive 
constitutionally protected common school funds.
224
 
Notably, the Court held that charter schools could not receive any 
funds from the general fund money—even from those accounts not 
allocated for the use of common schools.
225
 The Court reasoned that the 
Washington State Constitution prohibits non-common schools from 
receiving any funds dedicated for the use of common schools.
226
 On its 
face, this is a relatively narrow restriction. The only monies 
constitutionally dedicated for the exclusive use of common schools are 
the common school fund, the common school construction fund, and the 
state tax for common schools.
227
 However, case law has expanded this 
                                                     
217. Id. 
218. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512, at 
*3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013). 
219. Id. at *4–5. 
220. Id. at *5. 
221. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 397–98, 355 P.3d 1131, 
1133–34 (2015).  
222. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909). 
223. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 405, 355 P.3d at 1137 (citing Bryan, 51 Wash. at 
504, 99 P. at 30). 
224. Id. at 406–07, 355 P.3d at 1138–39. 
225. Id. at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139. 
226. Id. 
227. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
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category to include all money “allocated to the support of the common 
schools” regardless of its origin.228 A majority of school funding comes 
from the basic education allocation.
229
 Because the legislature 
appropriated the basic education allocation for the use of common 
schools, the Court ruled that it could not then redirect those funds to 
charter schools.
230
 The Court reasoned that, because the state 
commingled the unrestricted funds in the general fund with restricted 
property levy revenue, there was no way to ensure that only common 
schools had access to the levy funds.
231
 
Prohibiting charter schools from receiving even unrestricted funds 
from the general fund was fatal to Initiative 1240.
232
 Without access to 
any funding, charter schools could neither open nor operate.
233
 While the 
Court as unanimous in its holding that charter schools were not common 
schools, it split on the issue of severability. The majority held that the 
funding provisions were not severable, reasoning that the funding 
provisions were central to Initiative 1240’s approval and vital to its 
operation.
234
 Because the funding provisions affected an unconstitutional 
diversion of common school funds, the Court invalidated Initiative 1240 
entirely.
235
 
The Court’s initial slip opinion also contained a footnote briefly 
addressing the argument that Initiative 1240 violated the article IX 
uniformity requirement: 
                                                     
228. State ex rel. State Bd. for Vocational Educ. v. Yelle, 199 Wash. 312, 316, 91 P.2d 573, 575 
(1939). 
229. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, WASHINGTON STATE EDUCATION 
FUNDING 101 (2015), http://www.k12.wa.us/LegisGov/2015documents/2015LegislativePackage 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAE6-VUSY]. 
230. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 406, 355 P.3d at 1138. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 412, 355 P.3d at 1141. 
233. Id. (“Without a valid funding source the charter schools envisioned in I–1240 are not 
viable.”). 
234. The test for severability is “whether the unconstitutional provisions are so connected to the 
remaining provisions that it cannot be reasonably believed that the legislative body would have 
passed the remainder of the act’s provisions without the invalid portions.” Id. at 411–12, 355 P.3d at 
1140–41 (citing Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 197, 949 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1998); State v. 
Crediford, 130 Wash. 2d 747, 760, 927 P.2d 1129, 1135 (1996)). The Court found the funding 
sources were so intertwined with the rest of the Act that voters would not have passed the Act 
without the funding provisions. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 406, 355 P.3d at 1138. 
Thus, although the Act contained a severability clause, the Court concluded the invalid portions 
were not severable. Id. 
235. Id. 
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Further, under Bryan the absence of local control by voters 
would also violate the article IX uniformity 
requirement. . . . Bryan held in part that the legislation in 
question was invalid because ‘its operation . . . would break the 
uniformity of the common school system,’ that is, by having 
students instructed by uncertified teachers. Here, the uniformity 
of the common school system is similarly broken in that the 
Charter School Act eliminates the local voter control that is a 
hallmark of common schools, thereby resulting in different 
(nonuniform) governance for charter schools as compared to 
common schools.
236
 
The Court confined its discussion of the uniformity requirement to the 
common school system under Bryan. It did not address the broader 
import of the mandate on charter schools within the public system as a 
whole. 
The Court declined to elaborate on its position regarding the article 
IV general and uniform mandate, explaining, “we do not further address 
[Initiative 1240’s] article IX uniformity failings or the parties’ other 
arguments because we find the invalidity of the Act’s funding provisions 
as discussed herein to be dispositive.”237 Following a motion for 
reconsideration, the Court ultimately struck the footnote entirely, leaving 
the issue of article IX uniformity entirely untouched in the final, 
published opinion.
238
 
3. The 2016 Legislature Passes the Charter Public School Act 
Authorizing Charter Public Schools 
In 2016, the 64th Legislature passed the Charter Public School Act 
(CPSA) in response to the Court’s decision in League of Women 
Voters.
239
 The CPSA retains much of framework for creating, governing, 
and operating charter schools from Initiative 1240.
240
 However, the re-
enacted provisions establish a framework for charter schools that 
                                                     
236. League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash. 
Sept. 4, 2015) (citation omitted). 
237. Id. 
238. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters 
of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015) (No. 89714-0). 
239. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207. The bill became law as 
Chapter 241, Laws of 2016 without the governor’s signature. See John Higgins et al., Gov. Inslee 
Grudgingly Allows Charter Schools to Survive, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/charter-school-bill-likely-to-become-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/4AAW-YP36]. 
240. Id. §§ 101–38. 
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operates separately from common schools.
241
 Instead, charter schools are 
defined as public schools that offer an alternative to common schools.
242
 
As in Initiative 1240, charter schools operate according to a charter 
contract that establishes the specific operation requirements and 
performance standards for each individual charter school.
243
 As public 
schools, charter schools remain tuition-free and open to all children.
244
 
Charter schools remain subject to the charter school board, the 
authorizing agency, and the Washington State Charter Commission.
245
 
The CPSA retains the dual-authorizer structure that permits charter 
school founders to submit charter school proposals to either participating 
local districts or the Washington Charter School Commission.
246
 
Likewise, charter schools remain exempt from all rules and statutes 
governing common schools with the exception of certain laws 
enumerated in the CPSA or the charter contract.
247
 The Washington 
Charter School Commission also retains the general structure outlined in 
the Initiative, with the exception that it now comprises eleven members 
rather than nine.
248
 The two additional members are the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction or his or her designee and the chair of the State 
Board of Education.
249
 For the remaining nine members, appointment 
qualification and term length remain the same as those established in 
Initiative 1240.
250
 
While much of the CPSA resembles Initiative 1240, the legislation 
includes substantial revisions meant to directly address the Court’s 
concerns in League of Women Voters. For example, the CPSA makes 
charter schools ineligible to receive local school levy revenues or funds 
from the Common School Construction Fund.
251
 Charter schools must 
locate funding entirely from unrestricted sources because the legislation 
                                                     
241. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.020 (2014). 
242. Id. 
243. See id. § 28A.710.040. 
244. Id. § 28A.710.020. 
245. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, §§ 103, 104, 107. 
246. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.710.020(3), 28A.710.160. 
247. Id. § 28A.710.040(3). 
248. Id. §§ 28A.710.070(2)(i)–(iii). 
249. Id. 
250. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, § 107 (codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.070) (black-line illustrates relatively few changes to this section). 
251. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, § 122(2)–(9) (codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.220). 
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places the schools plainly outside the common school system.
252
 Under 
the CPSA, the legislature will appropriate amounts to support charter 
schools from the Washington Opportunity Pathways Account.
253
 From 
this lump sum, the superintendent of public instruction must calculate 
and distribute funding to charter schools “equitably with state funding 
provided for other public schools.”254 This includes adherence to the 
general apportionment as well as supplementary funds based on state 
formulas.
255
 While charter schools may not receive funding from the 
Common School Construction Fund, they may receive construction 
funds from other sources.
256
 Charter schools are eligible to apply for 
grants to the same extent as district schools.
257
 
The CPSA includes remedial measures intended to mitigate the 
consequences of the Court’s opinion in League of Women Voters. The 
CPSA provides all parties who entered into a contract under Initiative 
1240 the opportunity to re-execute the contracts upon substantially the 
same terms and for the same duration.
258
 Early drafts of the CPSA also 
required the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to 
reimburse charter schools for the loss of state revenue for the 2015–2016 
school year.
259
 After the ruling in League of Women Voters, Governor 
Inslee authorized charter schools to operate under the supervision of 
district schools as alternative learning experiences.
260
 An alternative 
learning experience is a course primarily characterized by its location 
away from the classroom setting.
261
 Because the alternative learning 
                                                     
252. See League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 
(2015) (holding that commingling of common school funds with the general funds makes it 
impossible “to ensure that these dollars are used exclusively to support the common schools”); Sch. 
Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 505, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909) (holding only common 
schools can receive common school funds). 
253. Unlike the general fund, the Washington Opportunity Pathways account is a dedicated 
account for revenue from the state lottery. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20A.892. Revenue from the 
opportunity pathways account is statutorily restricted to eleven education-related programs. Id. 
§ 28B.76.526. 
254. Id. § 28A.710.280. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. § 28A.710.230(1). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. § 28A.710.230(3). 
259. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, WASH. STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, E2SSB 
6194 BILL ANALYSIS 5 (2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bill%20Reports 
/House/6194-S2.E%20HBA%20ED%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFR4-5RBG]. 
260. See Ann Dornfeld, Washington Charter Schools Get Creative to Keep State Funding, 
KUOW.ORG (Jan. 5, 2016), http://kuow.org/post/washington-charter-schools-get-creative-keep-state 
-funding [https://perma.cc/4F6L-E7KY]. 
261. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-121-182. 
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experience funding did not cover the entire expense of charter-school 
operating costs for the 2015–2016 school year, early drafts required the 
legislature to reimburse charter schools for the difference between 
expected and received funding for that school term.
262
 However, this 
provision did not make it into the final legislation.
263
 
The CPSA also creates new funding provisions for other educational 
programs outside the common school system.
264
 The Court’s holding 
regarding commingling of the general fund created problems not just for 
charter schools, but for all education programs outside the common 
school system.
265
 This includes the National Guard Youth Challenge 
Program, the Early Entrance Program or Transition School Program at 
the University of Washington, education programs for juvenile inmates 
of the Department of Corrections, education center programs, the 
Washington Community Learning Center Program and the state-tribal 
education compact programs.
266
 Under the CPSA, each of these 
programs received funding through the Washington Opportunity 
Pathways Account.
267
 
III. ARTICLE IX AND THE GENERAL AND UNIFORM 
REQUIREMENT 
The legislature sought to address the Court’s primary constitutional 
objections to Initiative 1240 by removing charter public schools from the 
common school system and making them ineligible to receive restricted 
funds under the CPSA.
268
 However, because it purports to place charter 
schools within the public school system, the charter legislation must be 
consistent with the broader constitutional mandate that the legislature 
provide for a “general and uniform system of public schools.”269 The 
Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered whether charter 
schools fit within the general and uniform system of public schools.
270
 In 
                                                     
262. See S.B. Rep. 6194 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-
16/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/6194%20SBA%20WM%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M7N-BQJS]. 
263. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207. 
264. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526 (2014). 
265. Cf. id.; League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 409, 355 P.3d 
1131, 1139 (2015). 
266. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526. 
267. See id. 
268. See League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139. 
269. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
270. In a recent ruling granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, King County Superior Court Judge 
John Chun noted: 
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the handful of decisions purporting to define the scope of this 
requirement, the Court appears to focus on uniformity of the schools 
themselves, rather than on the system by which the state administers 
those schools.
271
 However, because these opinions contemplate the 
scope of the “general and uniform” requirement in relation only to 
common schools, it is not yet clear how Washington courts would apply 
the mandate to charter schools. 
In addition to the Washington State Supreme Court cases directly 
interpreting the general and uniform mandate in article IX, section 2, 
other cases interpreted similar phrases found elsewhere in the 
Washington State Constitution provide some insight into its operation.
272
 
Unlike the cases emphasizing the substantive uniformity of the common 
school system, cases applying the phrase to other contexts generally 
construe the terms as operating to require a uniform system of laws or 
procedures without regard to the substantive outcome.
273
 Likewise, cases 
interpreting similar or identical clauses in other state constitutions are 
also instructive.
274
 These cases also reveal that other state supreme 
courts have not interpreted the general and uniform mandate as requiring 
uniform schools, but only as requiring a uniform system of laws and 
procedures governing those schools.
275
 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court has Interpreted the Article 
IX “General and Uniform” Requirement Only in the Context of 
Common Schools 
The Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered whether 
legislation providing for charter schools can meet the “general and 
                                                     
Plaintiffs contend that the Act violates article IX, section 2’s uniformity requirement for the 
public school system. Their argument, however, conflates common schools with public 
schools. Common schools are but one component of the public school system, yet Plaintiffs’ 
argument attempts to measure charter schools against common schools rather than the broader 
public school system . . . Thus, the uniformity analysis requires measurement against the public 
school system and not solely common schools. 
Memorandum Opinion & Order Re: Summary Judgment, El Centro De La Raza v. Washington, No. 
16-2-18527-4 SEA (Feb. 17, 2017). 
271. See Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009); 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (1978); 
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 729, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (1974), 
overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97; Sch. Dist. No. 20, 
Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909). 
272. See infra section III.B. 
273. See id. 
274. See infra section III.C. 
275. See id. 
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uniform” mandate in article IX, section 2. A handful of cases purport to 
define the mandate, but they did so only in the context of common 
schools.
276
 Notably, in its original opinion in League of Women Voters, 
the Washington State Supreme Court initially noted in dictum that 
charter schools did not satisfy the requirement.
277
 However, the Court 
deleted the footnote in its amended opinion.
278
 The scope and 
implications of the “general and uniform” mandate, therefore, remain 
unsettled. 
Bryan is the earliest case analyzing the general and uniform 
mandate.
279
 In that case, the Court described a general and uniform 
system as one in which all students are “subject to the same discipline as 
every other child.”280 The Court’s discussion appeared in dictum as the 
case was resolved on other grounds—namely the fact that the statute 
unconstitutionally diverted common school funds.
281
 The Court appeared 
to consciously limit its discussion to the requirements of the mandate on 
the common school system: in addressing Spokane County’s arguments, 
the Court noted, “the argument of counsel emphasizes the fact that in its 
operation the act of 1907 would break the uniformity of the common 
school system.”282 
More recent cases interpreting the general and uniform mandate in the 
context of article IX, section 2 include a handful of decisions regarding 
school funding.
283
 In the 1970s, two cases discussed the mandate in the 
                                                     
276. See Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, 167 Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948; Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 of King Cty., 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97; Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417, 84 Wash. 2d 
at 729, 530 P.2d at 202; Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
277. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash. Sept. 4, 
2015). 
278. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters of 
Wash., 184 Wash. 2d, 355 P.3d 131 (2015) (No. 89714-0). 
279. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
280. Id. at 502, 99 P. at 29. Notably, this language is nearly identical to the definition advanced in 
the 1890 North Carolina case City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586, 589 (1890).  
281. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
282. Id. 
283. See, e.g., Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 
(2009) (challenging disparate school employee salary figures under the Basic Education Act as 
unconstitutional); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 71, 
97 (1978) (seeking a declaration that the State’s reliance on special excess levy funding for 
discharging its duty to provide for the education of resident children was unconstitutional); 
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 729, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (1974), 
overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97 (challenging 
constitutionality of school finance system). 
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context of taxation.
284
 In Northshore School District v. Kinnear,
285
 the 
Court held that a tax-credit program implemented by the Department of 
Revenue intended to achieve equality in school support was consistent 
with the objectives of article IX, section 2.
286
 The Court also held that 
using local school levies to fund common schools did not violate the 
general and uniform mandate despite the fact that it resulted in disparate 
funding sources for schools in different districts.
287
 The Northshore 
Court defined a general and uniform system as “one in which every child 
in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably 
standardized educational and instructional facilities and 
opportunities.”288 Four years later, the Court overruled Northshore, 
holding that “compliance with [the Washington State Constitution] can 
be achieved only if sufficient funds are derived, through dependable and 
regular tax sources, to permit school districts to provide a ‘basic 
education’ . . . in a ‘general and uniform System of public schools.’”289 
Most recently, in Federal Way School District No. 210 v. State,
290
 the 
Court held that funding disparities for staff salaries did not violate the 
general and uniform mandate.
291
 The Court explained, “the provision 
requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the 
minutiae of funding.”292 
In each of these cases, the Court discussed the general and uniform 
mandate, but only in the context of the common school system. 
Although the Bryan Court explicitly constrained its definitions of 
“general and uniform” to the common schools, the definitions advanced 
by the Court in Northshore and Federal Way arose from challenges to 
laws concerning the common school system. Consequently, there is a 
relative lack of authority on the interpretation of the term as it applies 
outside the common school context. 
                                                     
284. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 71; Northshore, 84 Wash. 2d at 
685, 530 P.2d at 178.  
285. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974). 
286. Id. at 729, 530 P.2d at 202.  
287. Id.  
288. Id. 
289. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 2).  
290. 167 Wash. 2d 514, 219 P.3d 941 (2009). 
291. Id. at 527, 219 P.3d at 948. 
292. Id. 
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B. Other Interpretations of the Term “Uniform” in the Washington 
State Constitution Conflict with the Substance-Based Definitions 
Articulated in the Common School Context 
The term “uniform” appears in several provisions throughout the 
Washington State Constitution. In nearly every instance, it appears in the 
form of a mandate to the legislature to establish laws, rules or 
procedures.
293
 However, outside the common school context, courts 
generally treat the term uniform as a procedural standard rather than a 
substantive guideline.
294
 While the independent context of each 
constitutional provision must be taken into account, these conflicting 
interpretations provide important insight into the original understanding 
of the term as it was used in the constitutional scheme. Taken together, 
these cases illustrate that the substance-based interpretations advanced in 
the common school cases are an exception to the Court’s general 
treatment of uniformity as a procedural requirement. 
Early cases interpreting the uniformity mandate illustrate the Court’s 
procedure-based interpretation.
295
 In 1890, the Washington State 
Legislature passed a statute authorizing the commissioners of each 
county to appoint county deputies and fix the salaries of such officers as 
the needs of the county required.
296
 Article XI, section 5, requires the 
legislature to provide “by general and uniform laws” for the election and 
compensation of all county officers.
297
 Mr. Nelson, a resident taxpayer 
of Clallam County, challenged the statute, arguing that the legislature’s 
delegation of power to the individual counties and the resulting inter-
                                                     
293. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“The legislature shall establish a system of county government, 
which shall be uniform throughout the state except as hereinafter provided, and by general laws 
shall provide for township organization . . . .”); id. art. XI, § 5 (“The legislature, by general and 
uniform laws, shall provide for the election in the several counties of boards of county 
commissioners, sheriffs, county clerks, treasurers, prosecuting attorneys and other county, township 
or precinct and district officers, as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties, 
and fix their terms of office.”); id. art. IV, § 24 (“The judges of the superior courts, shall from time 
to time, establish uniform rules for the government of the superior courts.”); id. art XII, § 19 (“The 
legislature shall, by general law of uniform operation, provide reasonable regulations to give effect 
to this section.”). Notably, art. XII, § 19, which relates to regulation of telephone and telegraph 
companies, states: “The legislature shall, by general law of uniform operation, provide reasonable 
regulations to give effect to this section.” WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 19 (emphasis added). This 
language strongly suggests the term uniform applies to procedure, and not substance. 
294. See infra section III.C. 
295. Nelson v. Troy, 11 Wash. 435, 39 P. 974 (1895); State v. Fleming, 88 Wash. 583, 153 P. 347 
(1915). 
296. Nelson, 11 Wash. at 437, 39 P. 975. 
297. Id. at 436–37, 39 P. 974–75 (citing WASH. CONST. art. XI § 5). 
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county variation in deputy salaries “destroy[ed] the uniformity of the 
operation of law.”298 
In support of this argument, Mr. Nelson cited the California case of 
Dougherty v. Austin,
299
 in which the California Supreme Court had 
invalidated similar legislation as violating an analogous “general and 
uniform” mandate in the California State Constitution.300 In that case, 
the California Supreme Court held that the law was not general in nature 
and uniform in operation because it delegated the authority to hire 
supporting staff to only certain classes of counties.
301
 The Washington 
State Supreme Court rejected the case as inapposite because the 
Washington legislation extended to all counties within the state.
302
 
The Court also rejected Mr. Nelson’s substance-based argument that 
the resulting inter-county salary variation destroyed the uniformity of the 
laws, explaining that the fact that the law produced inter-county 
variation in deputy salaries was not determinative of the issue.
303
 
Instead, the Court assessed whether the statute operated in such a way 
that “like conditions insur[ed] like results.”304 Because the deputy-
appointment statute was a “general provision . . . applicable to all classes 
of counties,” the Court held that it satisfied the uniformity requirement 
imposed by article XI, section 5.
305
 
In State ex rel Maulsby v. Fleming,
306
 the Court again applied a 
procedural analysis to hold that a law which facially discriminated 
between counties throughout the state violated article XI, section 5.
307
 
The statute at issue authorized prosecuting attorneys and justices of the 
peace to assume the duty of coroners in all counties “except counties of 
the first class.”308 The Court held that such facial discrimination violated 
the uniformity requirement of the constitution: “It is plain that this is not 
a uniform system . . . [for] the Legislature certainly has no right, under 
                                                     
298. Id. 
299. 29 P. 1092 (Cal. 1892). 
300. Id. at 1092. 
301. Id. 
302. Nelson, 11 Wash. at 440, 39 P. at 976. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 446, 39 P. at 977. 
305. Id. at 445, 39 P. at 977. 
306. 88 Wash. 583, 153 P. 347 (1915). 
307. Id. at 586–87; 153 P. at 349. 
308. Id. at 584, 153 P. at 348. 
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[article XI], to provide for officers in the counties of the first class which 
are not provided for in other counties.”309 
The Court’s opinion in Mount Spokane Skiing Corporation v. 
Spokane County
310
 provides a more recent example of a Washington 
court applying a procedural-based interpretation of the uniformity 
mandate.
311
 In that case, Mount Spokane Skiing Corporation (Spokane 
Skiing) entered into a twenty-year agreement with the State Parks and 
Recreation Commission to operate an outdoor recreation facility in the 
publicly owned Mount Spokane State Park.
312
 In 1990, a state-
commissioned consultant concluded that Spokane Skiing was providing 
“substandard” service.313 Based on these concerns, the Board of Spokane 
County Commissioners created the Public Development Authority, a 
public corporation, to manage the Mount Spokane State Park recreation 
facility.
314
 Spokane Skiing filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Authority was an illegal entity and that RCW 35.21.730—which 
authorized cities and counties to charter public corporations to 
participate in federally assisted programs addressing the living 
conditions in urban areas—violated the “general and uniform” 
requirement in article XI, section 4.
315
 
Spokane Skiing argued the different public corporations permitted 
under RCW 35.21.730 violated article XI, section 4 by creating an 
unconstitutional lack of uniformity.
316
 Under its interpretation of article 
XI, section 4, the Constitution required “one system applicable alike in 
all its parts and continuously operating equally in all of the counties of 
the state.”317 The Court rejected Spokane Skiing’s definition, reasoning 
that “[s]uch a strict requirement of ‘uniform’ fails to allow for the 
discretion necessary to meet the particular needs of each county.”318 
Instead, the Court employed a more procedure-focused approach: 
“Under, RCW 35.21.730, all counties have the authority to create public 
corporations. The statute further provides the proper purposes for which 
                                                     
309. Id. at 585, 153 P. at 348. 
310. 86 Wash. App. 165, 936 P.2d 1148 (1997). 
311. Id. at 180, 936 P.2d at 1155–56. 
312. Id. at 169, 936 P.2d at 1150. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 169–70, 936 P.2d at 1151; see also WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
316. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp., 86 Wash. App. at 180, 936 P.2d at 1155–56. 
317. Id. (The Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. Court relied on a definition taken from Coulter v. 
Pool, 201 P. 120, 125 (Cal. 1921).). 
318. Id. at 181, 936 P.2d at 1156. 
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a corporation may be created. Such a system is uniform.”319 The Court 
emphasized that the uniformity stemmed from the fact that “each county 
has the authority [to create municipal corporations] available to it.”320 It 
went on to explain that variation in the corporations created by the 
county did not violate the Constitution because “[t]he manner in which 
the county exercises this discretion should not be required to be strictly 
uniform.”321 
The procedure-based interpretation of the uniformity mandate applied 
by the judiciary in Nelson, Fleming, and Mount Spokane Skiing is also 
consistent with the text of the Washington State Constitution. Article 
VII, section 1 states, “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and 
shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.”322 This 
constitutional recognition of inter-class variation is significant because it 
recognizes the authority of the legislature to differentiate between 
constitutionally recognized classes so long as laws have uniform 
application within a class. Thus, outside the common school context, the 
procedural nature of the term uniform in the Washington State 
Constitution is plain. 
C. Other States with Similar Constitutional Language Have 
Interpreted the Uniformity Requirement to Mandate Uniform Laws 
but Not Uniform Schools 
When the meaning of a term is not clear from the Constitution’s text, 
courts look to other contemporaneous uses and interpretations.
323
 
Washington framers borrowed liberally from the constitutions of other 
states, including Oregon, California, and Wisconsin.
324
 Moreover, 
because of the constitutional pluralism prevalent amongst most western-
territories turned states, it is common to find certain clauses lifted 
                                                     
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
323. Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 727, 530 P.2d 178, 201–02 
(1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. V. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 
71, 97 (challenging constitutionality of school finance system); see also Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 
2d 286, 291, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959) (recognizing that when interpreting what the framers of 
the Washington State Constitution meant by a “general and uniform system,” the Court should 
consider the history of events preceding and contemporary to the adoption of the Washington State 
Constitution). 
324. James M. Dolliver, The Mind of the Founders: An Assessment of the Washington 
Constitution of 1889, in WASHINGTON COMES OF AGE 135, 135 (David H. Stratton ed., 1992). 
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directly from the constitutions of earlier colonial states.
325
 The phrase 
“general and uniform system of free public schools” first appeared in the 
North Carolina State Constitution drafted over a century earlier in 
1776.
326
 Consequently, interpretations of analogous provisions in other 
states’ constitutions may shed light on the original understanding of the 
language used in the Washington State Constitution. 
1. Oregon 
Before Washington’s territorial grant, Oregon governed much of the 
land that is now Washington State.
327
 The first schools established in 
present-day Washington State were established under Oregon’s 
constitutional framework.
328
 Thus, the interpretation of Oregon’s 
education provisions may be particularly indicative of the Washington 
Constitution’s education mandates. Article VIII, section 3 of the Oregon 
State Constitution charges the legislative assembly with the creation of 
“a uniform, and general system of Common schools.”329 Like the 
Washington Constitution, Oregon’s appears to contemplate a distinction 
between public schools and common schools: “[t]he legislative assembly 
shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform and general 
system of common schools.”330 
In the 1898 case of Harris v. Burr,
331
 the Oregon State Supreme Court 
emphasized that its constitution delegated to the legislature the “plenary 
power” to establish a system of public schools.332 In that case, Laura A. 
Harris sued Sherwood Burr and others for denying her the privilege of 
voting in a local school district election.
333
 The trial court found in Ms. 
Harris’ favor, holding that Mr. Burr’s actions violated the legislative act 
conferring upon women the right to vote at school district elections.
334
 
After closely analyzing the Oregon Constitution, the Court concluded 
that the Oregon Constitution did not prescribe the requirements for 
                                                     
325. See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: 
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 645–52 (1987). 
326. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1776). 
327. THOMAS WILLIAM BIBB, HISTORY OF EARLY COMMON SCHOOL EDUCATION IN 
WASHINGTON 4 (1929). 
328. Id. 
329. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
330. Id. 
331. 52 P. 17 (Or. 1898). 
332. Id. at 20. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
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school district officials or elections.
335
 As a result, the Court reasoned, 
the state constitution vested discretion to regulate those matters in the 
legislature.
336
 
Perhaps because of the clear delineation of power to the legislature 
recognized in Harris v. Burr, Oregon courts have not addressed a 
challenge to charter schools on the basis that the schools violate the 
uniform and general system of schools. In 1999, Oregon passed Senate 
Bill 100
337
 authorizing charter schools. In the interceding decades, the 
courts have not considered a constitutional challenge to the legislation 
on the grounds that it violates the uniformity of the public school 
system. The legislation has many of the same features as charter 
legislation in Washington.
338
 It permits both local school districts and the 
central State Board of Education to authorize charter schools.
339
 The 
schools are open to all students, with over-enrolled schools determining 
enrollment by a lottery.
340
 However, unlike Washington’s charter school 
legislation, Oregon’s charter school legislation does not require all 
teachers to hold state certifications.
341
 It also does not apply collective 
bargaining agreements to non-district sponsored charter schools.
342
 
2. Colorado 
While Oregon courts had no occasion to consider a uniformity 
challenge to charter school legislation, the Colorado State Supreme 
Court considered such an action in a 2009 case.
343
 Colorado enacted 
charter school authorizing legislation in 1993.
344
 Under the original Act, 
charter schools could be authorized only by local school district 
approval.
345
 In 2004, the legislature amended the Act by adding a set of 
                                                     
335. Id. 
336. See id. 
337. Act of May 27, 70th Leg., 1999 Or. Laws ch. 200. 
338. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 338.005–.165. 
339. See id. § 338.005 (defining “sponsor” to include the board of the common school district or 
the union high school district in which the public charter school is located, the State Board of 
Education, or an institution of higher education). 
340. Id. § 338.125(2)–(3). 
341. See id. § 338.135 (this section defines employee requirements but does not include state 
certification). 
342. Id. 
343. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. RE-2 v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 217 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 
2009). 
344. Id.; Charter Schools Act, ch. 227, 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws 1051. 
345. See Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 921. 
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amendments known as Part Five.
346
 The Part Five amendments 
established an alternative means of establishing charter schools by 
creating an independent state agency, termed the Institute, authorized to 
approve or deny applications for charter schools.
347
 The Part Five 
amendments thus resulted in two types of charter schools: district charter 
schools, which contract with the school boards of local districts; and 
institute charter schools, which contract with the Institute.
348
 
An Institute charter school is “a public school within the state, [that 
is] unaffiliated with a school district.”349 Institute charter schools are 
open to all children living within the State of Colorado, not just to 
children residing within the district where the institute charter school is 
physically located.
350
 The Colorado Department of Education funds the 
institute charter schools based on the number of students in attendance 
using the same formula is if the students attended a public school in the 
local school district where the institute charter school is located.
351
 
School districts are not, however, required to support institute charter 
schools with locally raised funds.
352
 
Three Colorado school districts and several individual plaintiffs 
brought cases challenging the validity of the Part Five amendments.
353
 
The trial court consolidated the claims, granted partial summary 
judgment in favor of the State on constitutional claims, and dismissed 
the remaining claims with prejudice.
354
 Only one of the plaintiff school 
districts, Boulder Valley, pursued an appeal.
355
 Although the motion for 
summary judgment involved constitutional and non-constitutional 
claims, Boulder Valley appealed only the ruling that Part Five does not 
violate the Colorado Constitution.
356
 On appeal, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute was 
constitutional.
357
 
                                                     
346. Id.; Act of June 3, ch. 358, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1594. 
347. Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 921. 
348. See id. 
349. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-507(1)(b)). 
350. Id. 
351. Id. at 921–22 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-507(2)). 
352. Id. at 922. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 928. 
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One of Boulder Valley’s constitutional objections on appeal centered 
on the following language in the Colorado Constitution: “The general 
assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools 
throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages 
of six and twenty-one years may be educated gratuitously.”358 
Boulder Valley argued that the plain meaning of this section required 
the General Assembly to establish a “single uniform system of public 
schools consisting of school districts . . . governed by locally elected 
officials.”359 Boulder Valley argued that this duty prohibits the General 
Assembly from establishing “a second and different system” governed 
by unelected individuals.
360
 
The Court rejected Boulder Valley’s argument, observing that nothing 
in the text of the Colorado Constitution necessarily required the School 
District’s restrictive reading: “We find no language in the provision that 
engrafts these criteria onto the phrase ‘thorough and uniform 
system.’”361 Relying on its previous interpretation in Lujan v. Colorado 
State Board of Education,
362
 the Court explained that the provision is 
satisfied if “thorough and uniform educational opportunities are 
available through state action in each school district.”363 Consequently, 
the Court held that the Institute charter schools established under Part 
Five satisfied the uniformity mandate because the Institute schools were 
equally available to all districts and students throughout the states.
364
 
3. North Carolina 
Interpretations of nearly identical constitutional language in North 
Carolina are also instructive. Early cases examining the North Carolina 
provision suggest the term “uniform” implicates a procedural 
requirement. That is, the term “uniform” requires laws of equal 
application throughout the state. In the 1890 case City of Greensboro v. 
Hodgin,
365
 the North Carolina Supreme Court explained the term 
“general” meant “not local; not limited to one or more places or 
                                                     
358. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
359. Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 928. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2). 
362. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
363. Id. at 1025. 
364. Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 928. 
365. City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586 (N.C. 1890). 
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localities in the state.”366 The term “uniform” required that the system 
must operate in the same way throughout the state: “[T]he system cannot 
be so regulated by statute as that it will apply and operate as a whole in 
some places, localities and sections of the state, and not in the same, but 
in different ways, in other places, localities, and sections.”367 The Court 
then concluded that the purpose of the clause was to ensure that “all the 
children within the prescribed ages, wherever they may reside in the 
state, [have] the same opportunity to obtain the benefits of education in 
free public schools.”368 Based on this language, the meaning of uniform 
seems to apply to the procedural operation of the laws. Thus, the laws 
established by the legislature to create the public school system must 
operate with equal force upon all subjects within the class. 
In a later case, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that 
state-funded high schools did not violate the state constitution even 
though not all districts had established high schools.
369
 The Court 
explained that “[t]he term ‘uniform’ here clearly does not relate to 
‘schools[;]’ . . . the term has reference to and qualifies the word 
‘system.’”370 The Court went on to explain that, although not all districts 
had established a high school, “provision is made for establishment of 
schools of like kind throughout all sections of the state and available to 
all of the school population of the territories contributing to their 
support.”371 
The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on a parallel line of cases 
interpreting the phrase in California. In the 1905 case Ex Parte 
Sohncke,
372
 the California Supreme Court explained that the word 
uniform in the constitution “does not mean ‘universal.’”373 Instead, it 
requires “simply that the effect of general laws shall be the same to and 
upon all persons who stand in the same relation to the law.”374 The 
California and North Carolina Supreme Courts’ interpretations of the 
general and uniform requirement place the emphasis on the legal 
procedures by which schools are established and governed rather than on 
the schools themselves. 
                                                     
366. Id. at 587. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
369. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Granville Cty., 93 S.E. 1001 (N.C. 1917). 
370. Id. at 1002 (citing Ex Parte Sohncke, 82 P. 956 (Cal. 1905)). 
371. Id. 
372. 82 P. at 956 (Cal. 1905). 
373. Id. at 958. 
374. Id. 
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IV. THE SYSTEM OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED BY 
THE 2016 LEGISLATURE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION 
When the Washington State Legislature passed the Amended Charter 
School Legislation, it did so against the backdrop of the 2015 litigation 
in League of Women Voters. At the trial court level, the League asserted 
two constitutional challenges. First, the League argued that charter 
schools under the Initiative 1240 were not common schools and, 
therefore, unconstitutionally diverted constitutionally restricted common 
school funds.
375
 Second, the League asserted that the charter schools 
under Initiative 1240 violated the Constitution’s requirement that the 
system of public schools be “general and uniform.”376 Ultimately, the 
Washington State Supreme Court invalidated Initiative 1240 on the 
grounds that it unconstitutionally diverted common school funds but did 
not decide the general and uniform issue.
377
 The amendments resulting 
from the Court’s decision incorporated into the CPSA reflect both 
reactive and proactive steps to bring charter schools within compliance 
with the Constitution.
378
 These changes—coupled with an appropriately 
framed understanding of the scope of the “general and uniform 
mandate”—should be sufficient to bring the system of charter schools 
within the general and uniform system of public schools required by the 
Constitution. 
A. The Legislature Has Remedied the Constitutional Funding Issues 
Identified in League of Women Voters of Washington v. State by 
Removing Charter Schools from the Common School System 
The CPSA specifically addresses the funding concerns identified by 
the Court in League of Women Voters. The Court’s invalidation of the 
funding mechanisms for charter schools dealt a fatal blow to the system 
of charter schools established under Initiative 1240.
379
 Because the Court 
unanimously found that charter schools under Initiative 1240 were not 
common schools, the schools were, therefore, ineligible to receive 
common school funds.
380
 Further, the majority’s reasoned that, because 
                                                     
375. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at 3–8, League of Women Voters 
of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013). 
376. Id. 
377. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015). 
378. See infra section IV.A. 
379. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 412–13, 355 P.3d at 1141. 
380. Id. at 409–10, 355 P.3d at 1139–40. 
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common school funds were located in the general fund, there was “no 
way to track restricted common school funds or to ensure that these 
dollars [were] used exclusively to support the common schools.”381 This 
co-mingling rationale effectively precluded charter schools from 
receiving any monies stored in the general fund.
382
 
The CPSA contains two substantive changes to remedy the 
constitutional funding issues that existed under Initiative 1240. First, the 
legislature removed charter schools from the common school system 
entirely.
383
 In League of Women Voters, the Court held that charter 
schools could not operate as common schools because they were not 
subject to local voter control—a key feature of the common school 
system.
384
 The legislature was, therefore, left with two possible 
solutions: restructure charter schools to conform to the local control 
requirement established by the Court in Spokane County v. Bryan, or 
remove charter schools from the common school system entirely. It 
chose the latter.
385
 Because charter schools are no longer within the 
common school system, the schools are no longer subject to the Bryan 
precedent requiring local voter control.
386
 
Although removing charter schools from the common school system 
addressed the Court’s objection to the charter school system’s lack of 
voter control, it also means that charter schools cannot receive any 
constitutionally restricted common school funds.
387
 The majority’s 
reasoning rendered the entire general fund off-limits to charter schools 
when prohibited the commingling of funds. The general fund is the 
state’s largest fund and receives its revenues from taxes, revenues, 
federal grants and revenues from licenses, permits and fees.
388
 To 
overcome this restriction, the legislature chose to fund charter schools 
under the CPSA from the Washington Opportunity Pathways Account 
                                                     
381. Id. at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139. 
382. OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., A GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE BUDGET PROCESS 6 (2016), 
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/reports/budgetprocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ2E-WD9K] [hereinafter 
BUDGET GUIDE]. The general fund supports not only common schools, but also numerous other 
public education programs. Taking the majority’s reasoning in League of Women Voters to its 
logical extreme, many public education programs—including high schools and running start 
programs—could lose funding. 
383. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010(5) (2014). 
384. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 405, 355 P.3d at 1137. 
385. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010(5). 
386. See Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909) 
(identifying local voter control as an essential element of the common school system). 
387. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139. 
388. See Budget Guide, supra note 382. 
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(the Pathways Account).
389
 The Pathways Account is a separate account 
that operates entirely independently from the general fund.
390
 
Allocating funds from the Pathways Account is a constitutional 
solution to the funding problems identified in League of Women Voters. 
The Pathways Account does not contain any funds restricted for the use 
of common schools, sidestepping any potential constitutional issues 
arising from CPSA appropriations.
391
 Several other educational 
programs that, like charter schools, are not subject to local voter control 
receive funding from the Pathways Account.
392
 This suggests that local 
voter control is not a prerequisite to receive funds from the Pathways 
Account as it would be from the general fund. 
B. The CPSA Establishes a General and Uniform System of Charter 
Schools 
Parties challenging the CPSA began to challenge the new law in court 
just days after its passage.
393
 If one or more of these cases reaches the 
Washington State Supreme Court, the Court will likely be confronted 
with the question of whether the CPSA satisfies the uniformity 
requirement in article IX, section 2 of the Washington State 
Constitution.
394
 Despite the Court’s footnote in its slip opinion in League 
of Women Voters warning that the charter schools under Initiative 1240 
likely violated the “general and uniform” requirement, if confronted with 
a similar challenge to the CPSA, the Court should find that the law 
satisfies the constitutional uniformity mandate. Although unsettled in the 
educational context, cases interpreting the term “uniform” suggest the 
term requires uniform operation of laws such that like conditions 
produce like results under the law.
395
 The phrase does not appear to 
require uniformity in the substantive results of the law so long as its 
operation is uniform. Because the CPSA provides a uniform system for 
                                                     
389. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.270. 
390. See BUDGET GUIDE, supra note 382. 
391. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526. 
392. Id. 
393. Complaint, El Centro de la Raza v. State, No. 16-2-18527-4 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 
2016). North Carolina also considered a similar suit challenging the validity of charter school 
legislation under its nearly identical constitutional provision. See Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. 
State, 712 S.E.2d 730 (2011). 
394. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11, n.10 (Wash. Sept. 
4, 2015). 
395. See supra Part III. 
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the establishment and administration of charter schools, the law satisfies 
this procedural-based understanding of the uniformity requirement. 
1. The “General and Uniform Mandate” Does Not Require 
Substantive Uniformity Between Schools; Rather, It Requires That 
Each School Be Governed By General And Uniform Laws And 
Procedures 
The “general and uniform” mandate requires that each class of school 
be governed by a general and uniform system of laws. It does not, 
however, require that the schools within the public school be uniform to 
one another. Washington cases considering the scope of the general and 
uniform mandate seem to focus on the uniformity of the schools 
themselves. However, the text of Constitution, the structure of the public 
school system, and interpretations reflecting the common understanding 
of the phrase all weigh in favor of a procedure-based interpretation. 
The text of article IX, section 2 suggests that the general and uniform 
requirement requires uniform procedures for the administration of public 
schools. The meaning of the term “general” is relatively straightforward. 
Contemporary dictionaries indicate that the term had two common 
meanings: “of, for, or from the whole or all” or “not particular; not 
local.”396 Both definitions are consistent with the common school 
movement’s goal of creating schools open to all students throughout the 
state regardless of income or locality.
397
 The use of the term “general” 
elsewhere in the Washington State Constitution reflects the second 
definition. Article XI, section 5 section requires legislature, “by general 
and uniform laws,” to “provide for the election” of various county 
officials.
398
 The section goes on to contrast general laws with “special” 
or “private” laws.399 A special law is one that applies only to specific 
things or persons within a class.
400
 By contrast, a general law applies to 
all persons or things within a class.
401
 Following this logic, the term 
“general” as used in article IX, section 2 requires the legislature to 
establish a system of schools that is equally available to all students 
                                                     
396. See Beale, supra note 26, at 550 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1983)). 
397. MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 52–55. 
398. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
399. Id. 
400. See Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 497–98, 154 P. 785, 785–86 
(1916). 
401. See id. 
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throughout the state. Thus, a system is general if it is not limited to a 
particular class or locality. 
a. The Text of Article IX, Section 2 Suggests the Uniformity 
Requirement Mandates a Uniform System Rather than Uniform 
Schools 
While the term “general and uniform system” is open to at least two 
interpretations, both the structure and the purpose of article IX, section 2 
provide greater support for a procedural definition. Although not entirely 
clear, the phrase “general and uniform” appears to modify the term 
“system” rather than “schools.” Thus, it is the procedural system that 
must be uniform rather than the substantive outcomes of the schools 
themselves. This procedure-based interpretation is also consistent with 
varied system of public schools described in the section.
402
 The 
constitution contemplates a public school system including common 
schools, high schools, and post-secondary vocational schools.
403
 A 
procedure-based interpretation of uniformity permits this legislature to 
effectuate this varied system of public schools by focusing on the 
uniformity of the laws by which the public schools are administered 
rather than the schools themselves. 
The text of article IX, section 2 presents interpretative difficulties. 
The sentence structure requiring a “general and uniform system of public 
schools” obscures the referent, making it difficult to determine what, 
exactly, must be general and uniform.
404
 Fundamentally, the phrase 
“general and uniform” modifies the term “system.”405 However, the term 
“system” is further modified by the phrase “of common schools.”406 The 
phrase is, therefore, susceptible to two different interpretations: one that 
requires a general and uniform system for the administration of public 
schools, and another that requires the schools themselves to be general 
and uniform. 
With respect to the term “general,” the two interpretations do not 
substantially impact the meaning of the requirement. By their very 
nature, the schools within the public school system are open to all 
students of eligible age throughout the state.
407
 Therefore, whether the 
                                                     
402. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
403. Id. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. 
407. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.010 (2014). 
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term general operates on the term system or on the term schools, the 
outcome will be the same. However, these alternative constructions 
substantially affect the meaning of the uniformity requirement. On the 
one hand, a uniform system would require a consistent set of laws, 
regulations, and procedures by which the legislature administers public 
schools. Thus, so long as the laws operate uniformly on all schools 
within a class, the uniformity of the schools themselves is not 
necessarily of constitutional import.
408
 On the other hand, if the mandate 
requires uniformity amongst the schools, it would likely preclude most 
alternative instructional schemes, including charter schools.
409
 
The sentence immediately following the “general and uniform” 
mandate suggests that the uniformity requirement is based in procedure 
rather than substantive outcomes. It states, “[t]he public school system 
shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, 
and technical schools as may hereafter be established.”410 This sentence 
illustrates that the drafters contemplated a system comprising several 
classes of schools. Common schools and high schools both provide the 
type of education generally associated with modern district-based 
schools. But the drafters also included in the public school system 
normal schools and technical schools—post-secondary schools that offer 
vocational training. As illustrated in Bryan, normal schools were 
operated by a director and subject to the control of a board of trustees; 
the schools operated in an entirely different manner than common 
schools, and were not subject to voter control.
411
 However, the 
Constitution plainly states that such schools are within the public school 
system.
412
 This variation within the public school system, therefore, 
supports an interpretation that focuses on the uniformity of the system 
by which the schools are established rather than the schools themselves. 
b. If Applied Beyond the Common School Context, a Substantive 
Interpretation of Uniformity Would Frustrate the System of Public 
Schools Required by the Washington State Constitution 
While a substantive interpretation of uniformity is a passable proxy 
for a procedurally uniform system in the common school context, 
applying the interpretation to non-common schools would severely 
                                                     
408. See Mount Spokane Skiing Corp., 86 Wash. App. at 165, 936 P.2d at 1148. 
409. Cf. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909). 
410. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
411. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28. 
412. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
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restrict the legislature’s ability to establish other constitutionally 
permissible classes of schools. Cases applying the mandate in the 
context of common schools advanced definitions emphasizing 
substantive uniformity despite the mandate’s language suggesting it 
applies to the system rather than the individual schools. Although this 
definition produces accurate results in the common school context, it 
fails when applied to other forms of public schools. Because the cases 
advancing a substantive interpretation of uniformity do so only in the 
context of common schools, future courts can easily avoid these 
problems by limiting the substantive definition to the common school 
context and embracing a procedure-based definition when assessing 
other systems of public schools. 
For example, in Federal Way School District No. 210, the Court 
stated that the Constitution required “uniformity in the educational 
program provided.”413 Likewise, the Court in Bryan defined a general 
and uniform system as one in which all students “shall have the same 
advantages and be subject to the same discipline as every other child.”414 
These definitions conflate the uniformity of the school system with the 
uniformity of the schools themselves. In the context of common schools, 
this subtle shift produces little, if any, difference in the analysis. The 
common school movement’s focus on uniformity and equality means 
that a properly administered system of common schools will be uniform 
in both procedure and outcomes.
415
 Inconsistency in the schools 
themselves necessarily signals a flaw in the system by which it is 
administered.
416
 Thus, when analyzing common schools, definitions 
based on substance, such as the one articulated in Federal Way School 
District No. 210 requiring “uniformity in the educational program 
provided,”417 function well as a screen for procedural deficits. 
The Court’s opinion in Bryan—the only case considering the general 
and uniform mandate involving both common and non-common 
schools—self-consciously restrained its discussion of the general and 
uniform mandate to the common school system.
418
 When contemplating 
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court noted that it would “break 
                                                     
413. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009). 
414. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 502, 99 P. at 29. Notably, this language is nearly identical to the 
definition advanced in the 1890 North Carolina case City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586, 587 
(1890). 
415. Cf. FIFE, supra note 145. 
416. Cf. id. 
417. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948. 
418. See Bryan, 51 Wash. at 498, 99 P. at 28. 
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the uniformity of the common school system.”419 The Court’s word 
choice is significant, because the case involved three different classes of 
schools: common schools, normal schools, and model training 
schools.
420
 Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that model 
training schools could not be common schools because they differed 
substantially in school governance, pupil selection, and teacher 
qualifications.
421
 However, the Court’s opinion also makes clear that 
these differences were not, in and of themselves, a constitutional 
violation.
422
 On this point, the Court remarked, “It is not that the 
Legislature cannot make provision for the support of a model training 
school, but in its attempt to do so, it has made provision for it out of the 
wrong fund.”423 Thus, although brief, the Court’s treatment of the 
general and uniform mandate suggests that it viewed article IX, section 2 
as requiring uniformity within the common school system, but not 
necessarily across the public school system as a whole. 
By constraining its application of the substantive interpretations of the 
uniformity requirement, the Bryan Court avoided the problems that 
would result from extending the definition to a non-common school. For 
instance, the Constitution provides that vocational schools are part of the 
public school system.
424
 However, vocational schools necessarily do not 
share “uniformity in the educational program[s] provided.”425 Students 
of auto mechanics must study a wholly different curriculum than 
apprenticing electricians. This clearly illustrates that a substance-based 
understanding of the uniformity requirement frustrates the system of 
public education contemplated in article IX, section 2. The definitions 
advanced by the Court in Northshore and Federal Way would provide 
similarly unworkable results outside the common school system. 
Certainly, the Constitution does not require that all public schools share 
uniform educational programs as the Federal Way Court’s definition 
suggests.
426
 If this were the case, seventh-graders and electricians alike 
would read from the same textbooks and sit for the same examinations. 
                                                     
419. Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30. 
420. See id. at 500, 99 P. at 28. 
421. See id. at 503, 99 P. at 29. 
422. See id. at 506, 99 P. at 31. 
423. Id. at 506, 99 P. at 31. 
424. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
425. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009). 
426. Id. 
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Such a result is plainly at odds with the public school system described 
in article IX of the Washington State Constitution.
427
 
Like the Bryan Court, Washington courts can avoid the problems 
implicated by a substantive-based interpretation of uniformity with 
relative ease. This is so because the cases in which the Courts advanced 
such definitions did so only in the context of common schools, allowing 
courts to distinguish when considering laws applying to non-common 
schools. In Northshore, Seattle School District No. 1, and Federal Way, 
the question before the Court concerned laws operating upon common 
schools.
428
 Because each case dealt exclusively with common schools, 
future courts may simply decline to extend the substantive-based 
uniformity interpretation beyond this class of schools. 
c. A Procedure-Based Interpretation of the Uniformity Requirement 
Is Consistent with the Judicial Interpretations of Uniformity in 
Other Contexts 
Cases interpreting the term uniform outside the common school 
context indicate a procedural requirement rather than a substantive 
standard. In Nelson v. Troy,
429
 State ex rel. Maulsby v. Fleming, and 
Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, the Washington State 
Supreme Court applied a procedure-based interpretation of the phrase 
when interpreting other portions of the Washington State Constitution. 
Likewise, courts interpreting similar constitutional provisions in other 
states employed a procedure-focused analysis of the challenged laws. 
Accordingly, a procedure-focused interpretation of the uniformity 
mandate in article IX, section 2 is the most consistent with the judicial 
consensus on the meaning of the term. 
Washington Courts adopted a procedure-based interpretation when 
analyzing the term “uniform” as used in article IX of the Washington 
State Constitution. Early cases suggest the Court’s original 
understanding of the term implicated an analysis of the operation of the 
law, rather than the substantive outcomes. In Nelson v. Troy, the Court 
                                                     
427. Cf. FIFE, supra note 145 (discussing Horace Mann’s early reports on teacher training schools 
and common schools); Washington Trade Schools and Vocational Schools, REAL WORK MATTERS, 
http://www.rwm.org/washington-trade-schools/ [https://perma.cc/62X9-H2KN] (describing courses 
of study including Dental and Mechanics).  
428. See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 530 P.2d 178, 181 
(1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 
71, 97 (challenging constitutionality of school finance system); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 
2d at 476, 585 P.2d at 71; Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, 167 Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948. 
429.  11 Wash. 435, 39 P. 974 (1895). 
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held that a statute permitting each county to appoint and set a salary for 
new deputies based on the county’s needs was constitutional because it 
operated equally on all counties throughout the state.
430
 Likewise, in 
State ex rel. Maulsby v. Fleming, the Court again used a procedure-based 
analysis in its opinion holding a law that facially discriminated between 
counties within the state violated article IX, section 4 of the Washington 
State Constitution.
431
 The Court applied a similar analysis in reaching its 
opinion in its more recent decision in Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. 
Spokane County.
432
 In that case, the Court held a statute permitting local 
municipalities to charter private municipal corporations did not violate 
the constitutional requirement that the “system of county 
government . . . be uniform throughout the state.”433 
The Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases interpreting the 
term “uniform” in article IX closely tracks the procedure-based 
interpretations advanced by other state courts interpreting similar 
language in the education context. For example, the Colorado State 
Supreme Court held that the state constitution’s requirement that the 
legislature provide for a “thorough and uniform” public school system 
was satisfied if “thorough and uniform educational opportunities are 
available through state action in each school district.”434 This 
interpretation places the Court’s analysis squarely on the laws and 
procedures established by the legislature to provide for a system of 
public education. Like the procedure-based definitions applied in 
Nelson, Fleming, and Mount Spokane, the definition of uniformity 
articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court permits variation amongst 
the entities within the system, so long as the system itself operates 
uniformly throughout the state.
435
 Similarly, in North Carolina, the State 
Supreme Court explained that the Court explained the term “uniform” in 
the phrase “a general and uniform system of public schools” 
clearly does not relate to ‘schools’ . . . the term has reference to 
and qualifies the word ‘system,’ and is sufficiently complied 
with where, by statute or authorized regulation of the public 
school authorities, provision is made for establishment of 
schools of like kind throughout all sections of the state and 
                                                     
430. Id. at 445, 39 P. at 976. 
431. State v. Fleming, 88 Wash. 583, 586–87, 153 P. 347, 348–49 (1915) (citing WASH. CONST. 
art. 11, § 4).  
432. 86 Wash. App. 165, 936 P.2d 1148 (1997). 
433. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
434. Lujan v. Colo. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982). 
435. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025. 
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available to all of the school population of the territories 
contributing to their support.
436
 
The prominence of the procedure-based interpretation of 
constitutional uniformity requirements suggests courts generally 
understand the term uniform as a standard applying to the laws and 
systems established by the legislature. Both Washington and other state 
courts were unconcerned with the uniformity of the resulting systems so 
long as the laws by which the systems were established operated 
uniformly throughout the state.
437
 Unlike the substantive-focused 
applications of the uniformity requirement in common school cases, a 
procedure-based interpretation applies to other forms of schools within 
the public school system. For example, vocational schools need not 
provide identical curricula or certification paths.
438
 But so long as the 
procedures by which the schools are established, monitored, and 
administered are uniform throughout the state, the system by which the 
schools are established satisfies the procedural uniformity 
requirement.
439
 Because the procedure-based application of uniformity 
preserves the variety of schools comprising the public school system as 
contemplated by the Constitution, Courts should reject the substantive 
application of the uniformity provision in favor of the procedural based 
application. 
2. The Charter School System Established Under CPSA Satisfies the 
Constitution’s Procedure-Based Uniformity Requirement 
If the Court uses a procedure-based interpretation of the uniformity 
requirement in, it will very likely find that the CPSA provides sufficient 
uniformity to withstand a constitutional challenge. As the Court 
explained in Nelson, a uniform system is one in which “like conditions 
insur[e] like results.”440 Because the CPSA applies on equal terms to all 
charter schools operating throughout the state, charter school system 
established under the CPSA meets the constitutional requirement for a 
general and uniform system. 
Under Initiative 1240, which attempted to define charter schools as 
common schools, the operation of the laws on the common school 
system was not uniform because the law treated similarly situated 
                                                     
436. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Granville Cty., 93 S.E. 1001, 1002 (N.C. 1917). 
437. See supra section IV.B.1. 
438. Washington Trade Schools and Vocational Schools, supra note 427. 
439. See id. 
440. Nelson, 11 Wash. at 437, 39 P. at 977. 
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common schools differently depending on whether the school was 
district- or charter- based.
441
 The CPSA cures this problem by placing 
charter schools in a single class separate from common schools.
442
 Thus, 
the CPSA must operate uniformly upon charter schools throughout the 
state, but the uniformity of its operation is no longer tethered to the 
treatment of common schools. The CPSA satisfies this standard by 
providing uniform standards for school authorization, charter contract 
terms, teacher certification, student achievement testing, and charter 
review and renewal procedures.
443
 
Notably, the authorization process established in the CPSA may 
operate differently depending upon the county or district in which the 
charter school is located. This is because the law’s dual-authorizer 
system permits either local districts or the Washington Charter School 
Commission to serve as authorizers.
444
 Individuals or organizations 
seeking to establish a charter school in a charter-friendly district will 
have access to two modes of authorization while schools in districts that 
do not wish to participate in charter authorizers must use the Charter 
School Commission.
445
 Despite this potential distinction in the 
authorizing body, the laws will not operate differently because the 
oversight mechanisms are the same whether the authorizer is a district or 
the Charter School Commission.
446
 Thus, so long as all individuals and 
organizations throughout the state have access to the ability to establish 
schools within the charter schools system, the authorizing entity will not 
interfere with the procedure-based uniformity of the system. 
In Mount Spokane Skiing, the Court explained that the uniformity of a 
system of laws was not determined by “[t]he manner in which [a] county 
exercises its discretion” but by the fact that “each county has the 
authority available to it.”447 The CPSA meets this procedure-based 
standard. While not all counties or districts throughout the state will 
necessarily choose to establish charter schools, the CPSA grants citizens 
throughout the state the authority to do so. Similarly, although charter 
                                                     
441. Initiative Measure No. 1240 § 101(1)(m) (approved Nov. 6, 2012), https://wei.sos.wa.gov/ 
agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/I-
1240_complete_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJ4N-FYYH]. 
442. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010 (2014). 
443. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.710.010–.901. 
444. Id. § 28A.710.080. 
445. See id. 
446. See id. § 28A.710.160. 
447. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane Cty., 86 Wash. App. 165, 181, 936 P.2d 1148, 
1156 (1997).  
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schools may differ in their curricula, goals, and mission statements, the 
CPSA ensures that the schools are uniform in their establishment, 
operation, and review. Consequently, despite the League of Women 
Voters Court’s warning in its now-deleted footnote that charter schools 
likely violated the uniformity of the common school system, the charter 
school system established under the CPSA satisfies the uniformity 
requirement in article IX, section 2 of the Washington State 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislation intended to establish public charter schools as an 
alternative to district-based common and high schools has been the 
subject of considerable scrutiny.
448
 In its most recent form, 
Washington’s charter legislation has remedied the constitutional 
deficiencies that led the Washington State Supreme Court to invalidate 
Initiative 1240.
449
 Nonetheless, the political nature of charter schools 
practically ensures the new legislation will be the subject of continued 
litigation and constitutional objections.
450
 Because the CSPA creates a 
separate class of charter public schools that are treated equally under the 
laws,
451
 the legislation will likely withstand constitutional objections 
based in the article IX general and uniform mandate. 
 
                                                     
448. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17 (describing community members’ reactions to the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling); John Higgins, State’s Largest Teacher’s Union 
Plans to Sue Over Charter-School Law, SEATTLE TIMES (April 7, 2016 at 8:42 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/wea-preps-lawsuit-against-new-charter-
schools-law/ [https://perma.cc/482M-ZNUE] (detailing legal and political opposition to revised 
charter school legislation); Lilly, supra note 178 (discussing early school choice legislation). 
449. See supra section IV.A. 
450. See Higgins, supra note 448. 
451. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.020 (2014). 
